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Section 11 of the Securities Act 
 
 
§ 3.04  Section 11 Affirmative Defenses 
 [C] The Statute of Limitations Defense 
 On page 131, add: 
CALPERS v. ANZ SECURITIES, INC. 
United States Supreme Court 
____ U.S. ____, 137 S. Ct. 2042, 198 L. Ed. 2d 584 (2017) 
JUSTICE KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The suit giving rise to the case before the Court was filed by a plaintiff who was a 
member of a putative class in a class action but who later elected to withdraw and proceed in this 
separate suit, seeking recovery for the same illegalities that were alleged in the class suit.  The 
class-action suit had been filed within the time permitted by statute.  Whether the later, separate 
suit was also timely is the controlling question. 
I 
A 
The Securities Act of 1933 “protects investors by ensuring that companies issuing 
securities . . . make a ‘full and fair disclosure of information’ relevant to a public offering.” . . .  
Companies [ordinarily] may offer securities to the public only after filing a registration 
statement, which must contain information about the company and the security for sale.  Section 
11 of the Securities Act “promotes compliance with these disclosure provisions by giving 
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underwriters, for any material misstatements or omissions in a registration statement. 
The Act provides time limits for § 11 suits.  These time limits are set forth in a two-
sentence section of the Act, § 13.  It provides as follows: 
“No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under [§ 11] unless 
brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or 
after such discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence . . . .  
In no event shall any such action be brought to enforce a liability created under [§ 11] 
more than three years after the security was bona fide offered to the public . . . .” 
So there are two time bars in the quoted provision; and the second one, the 3-year bar, is 
central to this case. 
B 
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. formerly was one of the largest investment banks in the 
United States.  In 2007 and 2008, Lehman raised capital through a number of public securities 
offerings.  Petitioner, California Public Employees’ Retirement System (sometimes called 
CalPERS), is the largest public pension fund in the country.  Petitioner purchased securities in 
some of these Lehman offerings; and it is alleged that respondents, various financial firms, are 
liable under the Act for their participation as underwriters in the transactions. . . . 
In September 2008, Lehman filed for bankruptcy.  Around the same time, a putative class 
action concerning Lehman securities was filed against respondents in the United States District 
Court for the Southern District of New York.  The operative complaint raised claims under § 11, 
alleging that the registration statements for certain of Lehman’s 2007 and 2008 securities 
offerings included material misstatements or omissions.  The complaint was filed on behalf of all 
Copyright © 2020 Carolina Academic Press, LLC. All rights reserved.
-3- 
 
persons who purchased the identified securities, making petitioner a member of the putative 
class.  Petitioner, however, was not one of the named plaintiffs in the suit.  The class action was 
consolidated with other securities suits against Lehman in a single multidistrict litigation. 
In February 2011, petitioner filed a separate complaint against respondents in the United 
States District Court for the Northern District of California.  This suit was filed more than three 
years after the relevant transactions occurred.  The complaint alleged identical securities law 
violations as the class-action complaint, but the claims were on petitioner’s own behalf.  The suit 
was transferred and consolidated with the multidistrict litigation in the Southern District of New 
York.  Soon thereafter, a proposed settlement was reached in the putative class action.  
Petitioner, apparently convinced it could obtain a more favorable recovery in its separate suit, 
opted out of the class. 
Respondents then moved to dismiss petitioner’s individual suit alleging § 11 violations as 
untimely under the 3-year bar in the second sentence of § 13.  Petitioner countered that its 
individual suit was timely because that 3-year period was tolled during the pendency of the class-
action filing.  The principal authority cited to support petitioner’s argument that the 3-year period 
was tolled was American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974). 
The District Court disagreed with petitioner’s argument, holding that the 3-year bar in § 
13 is not subject to tolling.  The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.  In agreement 
with the District Court, the Court of Appeals held that the tolling principle discussed in American 
Pipe is inapplicable to the 3-year time bar. . . . 
II 
The question then is whether § 13 permits the filing of an individual complaint more than 
three years after the relevant securities offering, when a class-action complaint was timely filed, 
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and the plaintiff filing the individual complaint would have been a member of the class but for 
opting out of it.  The answer turns on the nature and purpose of the 3-year bar and of the tolling 
rule that petitioner seeks to invoke.  Each will be addressed in turn. 
A 
As the Court explained in CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, [134 S.Ct. 2175] (2014), statutory 
time bars can be divided into two categories:  statutes of limitations and statutes of repose.  Both 
“are mechanisms used to limit the temporal extent or duration of liability for tortious acts,” but 
“each has a distinct purpose.” 
Statutes of limitations are designed to encourage plaintiffs “to pursue diligent prosecution 
of known claims.”  In accord with that objective, limitations periods begin to run “when the 
cause of action accrues”—that is, “when the plaintiff can file suit and obtain relief.”  In a 
personal-injury or property-damage action, for example, more often than not this will be “‘when 
the injury occurred or was discovered.’” 
In contrast, statutes of repose are enacted to give more explicit and certain protection to 
defendants.  These statutes “effect a legislative judgment that a defendant should be free from 
liability after the legislatively determined period of time.”  For this reason, statutes of repose 
begin to run on “the date of the last culpable act or omission of the defendant.” 
The  3-year time bar in § 13 reflects the legislative objective to give a defendant a 
complete defense to any suit after a certain period.  From the structure of § 13, and the language 
of its second sentence, it is evident that the 3-year bar is a statute of repose.  In fact, this Court 
has already described the provision as establishing “a period of repose,” which “‘impose[s] an 
outside limit’” on temporal liability.  Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 
501 U.S. 350, 363 (1991). 
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The statute provides in clear terms that “[i]n no event” shall an action be brought more 
than three years after the securities offering on which it is based.  This instruction admits of no 
exception and on its face creates a fixed bar against future liability. . . .  The statute, furthermore, 
runs from the defendant’s last culpable act (the offering of the securities), not from the accrual of 
the claim (the plaintiff’s discovery of the defect in the registration statement). . . . 
This view is confirmed by the two-sentence structure of § 13.  In addition to the 3-year 
time bar, § 13 contains a 1-year statute of limitations.  The limitations statute runs from the time 
when the plaintiff discovers (or should have discovered) the securities-law violation.  The pairing 
of a shorter statute of limitations and a longer statute of repose is a common feature of statutory 
time limits. . . .  The two periods work together:  The discovery rule gives leeway to a plaintiff 
who has not yet learned of a violation, while the rule of repose protects the defendant from an 
interminable threat of liability. . . . 
The history of the 3-year provision also supports its classification as a statute of repose.  
It is instructive to note that the statute was not enacted in its current form.  The original version 
of the 1933 Securities Act featured a 2-year discovery period and a 10-year outside limit, see § 
13, 48 Stat. 84, but Congress changed this framework just one year after its enactment.  The 
discovery period was changed to one year and the outside limit to three years.  See Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, § 207, 48 Stat. 908.  The evident design of the shortened statutory period 
was to protect defendants’ financial security in fast-changing markets by reducing the open 
period for potential liability. 
B 
The determination that the 3-year period is a statute of repose is critical in this case, for 
the question whether a tolling rule applies to a given statutory time bar is one “of statutory 
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intent.”  The purpose of a statute of repose is to create “an absolute bar on a defendant’s 
temporal liability,” and that purpose informs the assessment of whether, and when, tolling rules 
may apply. 
In light of the purpose of a statute of repose, the provision is in general not subject to 
tolling.  Tolling is permissible only where there is a particular indication that the legislature did 
not intend the statute to provide complete repose but instead anticipated the extension of the 
statutory period under certain circumstances. 
 For example, if the statute of repose itself contains an express exception, this 
demonstrates the requisite intent to alter the operation of the statutory period.  See . . . 29 U.S.C.  
§ 1113 (establishing a 6-year statute of repose, but stipulating that, in case of fraud, the 6-year 
period runs from the plaintiff’s discovery of the violation).  In contrast, where the legislature 
enacts a general tolling rule in a different part of the code—e.g., a rule that suspends time limits 
until the plaintiff reaches the age of majority—courts must analyze the nature and relation of the 
legislative purpose of each provision to determine which controls.  In keeping with the statute-
specific nature of that analysis, courts have reached different conclusions about whether general 
tolling statutes govern particular periods of repose. 
Of course, not all tolling rules derive from legislative enactments.  Some derive from the 
traditional power of the courts to “‘apply the principles . . . of equity jurisprudence.’”  The 
classic example is the doctrine of equitable tolling, which permits a court to pause a statutory 
time limit “when a litigant has pursued his rights diligently but some extraordinary circumstance 
prevents him from bringing a timely action.” . . . 
The purpose and effect of a statute of repose, by contrast, is to override customary tolling 
rules arising from the equitable powers of courts.  By establishing a fixed limit, a statute of 
Copyright © 2020 Carolina Academic Press, LLC. All rights reserved.
-7- 
 
repose implements a “‘legislative decisio[n] that as a matter of policy there should be a specific 
time beyond which a defendant should no longer be subjected to protracted liability.’”  The 
unqualified nature of that determination supersedes the courts’ residual authority and forecloses 
the extension of the statutory period based on equitable principles.  For this reason, the Court 
repeatedly has stated in broad terms that statutes of repose are not subject to equitable tolling. 
C 
Petitioner contends that the 3-year provision is subject to tolling based on the rationale 
and holding in the Court’s decision in American Pipe.  The language of the 3-year statute does 
not refer to or impliedly authorize any exceptions for tolling.  If American Pipe had itself been 
grounded in a legislative enactment, perhaps an argument could be made that the enactment 
expressed a legislative objective to modify the 3-year period.  If, however, the tolling decision in 
American Pipe derived from equity principles, it cannot alter the unconditional language and 
purpose of the 3-year statute of repose. 
In American Pipe, a timely class-action complaint was filed asserting violations of 
federal antitrust law.  Class certification was denied because the class was not large enough, see 
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 23(a)(1), and individuals who otherwise would have been members of the 
class then filed motions to intervene as individual plaintiffs.  The motions were denied on the 
grounds that the applicable 4-year time bar had expired.  The Court of Appeals reversed, 
permitting intervention. 
The Court affirmed.  It held that individual plaintiffs’ motions to intervene were timely 
because “the commencement of a class action suspends the applicable statute of limitations as to 
all asserted members of the class.”  The Court reasoned that this result was consistent “both with 
the procedures of Rule 23 and with the proper function of the limitations statute” at issue.  First, 
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the tolling furthered “the purposes of litigative efficiency and economy” served by Rule 23.  
Without the tolling, “[p]otential class members would be induced to file protective motions to 
intervene or to join in the event that a class was later found unsuitable,” which would “breed 
needless duplication of motions.”  Second, the tolling was in accord with “the functional 
operation of a statute of limitations.”  By filing a class complaint within the statutory period, the 
named plaintiff “notifie[d] the defendants not only of the substantive claims being brought 
against them, but also of the number and generic identities of the potential plaintiffs who may 
participate in the judgment.” 
As this discussion indicates, the source of the tolling rule applied in American Pipe is the 
judicial power to promote equity, rather than to interpret and enforce statutory provisions.  
Nothing in the American Pipe opinion suggests that the tolling rule it created was mandated by 
the text of a statute or federal rule.  Nor could it have.  The central text at issue in American Pipe 
was Rule 23, and Rule 23 does not so much as mention the extension or suspension of statutory 
time bars. 
The Court’s holding was instead grounded in the traditional equitable powers of the 
judiciary.  The Court described its rule as authorized by the “judicial power to toll statutes of 
limitations.” . . .  The Court also relied on cases that are paradigm applications for equitable 
tolling principles, explaining with approval that tolling in one such case was based on 
“considerations ‘deeply rooted in our jurisprudence.’” . . . 
Perhaps for these reasons, this Court has referred to American Pipe as “equitable tolling.” 
. . .  It is true, however, that the American Pipe Court did not consider the criteria of the formal 
doctrine of equitable tolling in any direct manner.  It did not analyze, for example, whether the 
plaintiffs pursued their rights with special care; whether some extraordinary circumstances 
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prevented them from intervening earlier; or whether the defendant engaged in misconduct. . . . 
The balance of the Court’s reasoning nonetheless reveals a rule based on traditional equitable 
powers, designed to modify a statutory time bar where its rigid application would create 
injustice. 
D 
This analysis shows that the American Pipe tolling rule does not apply to the 3-year bar 
mandated in § 13.  As explained above, the 3-year limit is a statute of repose.  And the object of 
a statute of repose, to grant complete peace to defendants, supersedes the application of a tolling 
rule based in equity.  No feature of § 13 provides that deviation from its time limit is permissible 
in a case such as this one.  To the contrary, the text, purpose, structure, and history of the statute 
all disclose the congressional purpose to offer defendants full and final security after three years. 
Petitioner raises four counterarguments, but they are not persuasive.  First, petitioner 
contends that this case is indistinguishable from American Pipe itself.  If the 3-year bar here 
cannot be tolled, petitioner reasons, then there was no justification for the American Pipe Court’s 
contrary decision to suspend the time bar in that case.  American Pipe, however, is 
distinguishable.  The statute in American Pipe was one of limitations, not of repose; it began to 
run when “‘the cause of action accrued.’”  The statute in the instant case, however, is a statute of 
repose.  Consistent with the different purposes embodied in statutes of limitations and statutes of 
repose, it is reasonable that the former may be tolled by equitable considerations even though the 
latter in most circumstances may not. 
Second, petitioner argues that the filing of a class-action complaint within three years 
fulfills the purposes of a statutory time limit with regard to later filed suits by individual 
members of the class.  That is because, according to petitioner, the class complaint puts a 
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defendant on notice as to the content of the claims against it and the set of potential plaintiffs 
who might assert those claims.  It is true that the American Pipe Court, in permitting tolling, 
suggested that generic notice satisfied the purposes of the statute of limitations in that case.  
While this was deemed sufficient in balancing the equities to allow tolling under the antitrust 
statute, it must be noted that here the analysis differs because the purpose of a statute of repose is 
to give the defendant full protection after a certain time. 
If the number and identity of individual suits, where they may be filed, and the litigation 
strategies they will use are unknown, a defendant cannot calculate its potential liability or set its 
own plans for litigation with much precision.  The initiation of separate individual suits may thus 
increase a defendant’s practical burdens. . . .  The emergence of individual suits, furthermore, 
may increase a defendant’s financial liability; for plaintiffs who opt out have considerable 
leverage and, as a result, may obtain outsized recoveries. . . .  These uncertainties can put 
defendants at added risk in conducting business going forward, causing destabilization in 
markets which react with sensitivity to these matters.  By permitting a class action to splinter into 
individual suits, the application of American Pipe tolling would threaten to alter and expand a 
defendant’s accountability, contradicting the substance of a statute of repose.  All this is not to 
suggest how best to further equity under these circumstances but simply to support the 
recognition that a statute of repose supersedes a court’s equitable balancing powers by setting a 
fixed time period for claims to end. 
Third, petitioner contends that dismissal of its individual suit as untimely would 
eviscerate its ability to opt out, an ability this Court has indicated should not be disregarded.  See 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 363 (2011).  It does not follow, however, from 
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any privilege to opt out that an ensuing suit can be filed without regard to mandatory time limits 
set by statute. 
Fourth, petitioner argues that declining to apply American Pipe tolling to statutes of 
repose will create inefficiencies.  It contends that nonnamed class members will inundate district 
courts with protective filings.  Even if petitioner were correct, of course, this Court “lack[s] the 
authority to rewrite” the statute of repose or to ignore its plain import. . . . 
And petitioner’s concerns likely are overstated.  Petitioner has not offered evidence of 
any recent influx of protective filings in the Second Circuit, where the rule affirmed here has 
been the law since 2013.  This is not surprising.  The very premise of class actions is that “‘small 
recoveries do not provide the incentive for any individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his 
or her rights.’”  Many individual class members may have no interest in protecting their right to 
litigate on an individual basis.  Even assuming that they do, the process is unlikely to be as 
onerous as petitioner claims.  A simple motion to intervene or request to be included as a named 
plaintiff in the class-action complaint may well suffice. . . .  District courts, furthermore, have 
ample means and methods to administer their dockets and to ensure that any additional filings 
proceed in an orderly fashion. . . . 
III 
Petitioner makes an alternative argument that does not depend on tolling.  Petitioner 
submits its individual suit was timely in any event.  Section 13 provides that an “action” must be 
“brought” within three years of the relevant securities offering.  Petitioner argues that 
requirement is met here because the filing of the class-action complaint “brought” petitioner’s 
individual “action” within the statutory time period. 
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This argument rests on the premise that an “action” is “brought” when substantive claims 
are presented to any court, rather than when a particular complaint is filed in a particular court.  
The term “action,” however, refers to a judicial “proceeding,” or perhaps to a “suit”—not to the 
general content of claims. . . .  Whether or not petitioner’s individual complaint alleged the same 
securities law violations as the class-action complaint, it defies ordinary understanding to suggest 
that its filing—in a separate forum, on a separate date, by a separate named party—was the same 
“action,” “proceeding,” or “suit.” 
The limitless nature of petitioner’s argument, furthermore, reveals its implausibility.  It 
appears that, in petitioner’s view, the bringing of the class action would make any subsequent 
action raising the same claims timely.  Taken to its logical limit, an individual action would be 
timely even if it were filed decades after the original securities offering—provided a class-action 
complaint had been filed at some point within the initial 3-year period.  Congress would not have 
intended this result. 
. . . . 
Tolling may be of great value to allow injured persons to recover for injuries that, 
through no fault of their own, they did not discover because the injury or the perpetrator was not 
evident until the limitations period otherwise would have expired.  This is of obvious utility in 
the securities market, where complex transactions and events can be obscure and difficult for a 
market participant to analyze or apprehend.  In a similar way, tolling, as allowed in American 
Pipe, may protect plaintiffs who anticipated their interests would be protected by a class action 
but later learned that a class suit could not be maintained for reasons outside their control. 
The purpose of a statute of repose, on the other hand, is to allow more certainty and 
reliability.  These ends, too, are a necessity in a marketplace where stability and reliance are 
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essential components of valuation and expectation for financial actors.  The statute in this case 
reconciles these different ends by its two-tier structure:  a conventional statute of limitations in 
the first clause and a statute of repose in the second. 
The statute of repose transforms the analysis.  In a hypothetical case with a different 
statutory scheme, consisting of a single limitations period without an additional outer limit, a 
court’s equitable power under American Pipe in many cases would authorize the relief petitioner 
seeks.  Here, however, the Court need not consider how equitable considerations should be 
formulated or balanced, for the mandate of the statute of repose takes the case outside the bounds 
of the American Pipe rule. 
The final analysis, then, is straightforward.  The 3-year time bar in § 13 of the Securities 
Act is a statute of repose. Its purpose and design are to protect defendants against future liability.  
The statute displaces the traditional power of courts to modify statutory time limits in the name 
of equity.  Because the American Pipe tolling rule is rooted in those equitable powers, it cannot 
extend the 3-year period.  Petitioner’s untimely filing of its individual action is ground for 
dismissal. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit is affirmed. 
*** 
JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE BREYER, JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, and 
JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting. 
A class complaint was filed against respondents well within the three-year period of 
repose set out in § 13 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77m.  That complaint informed 
respondents of the substance of the claims asserted against them and the identities of potential 
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claimants.  Respondents, in other words, received what § 13’s repose period was designed to 
afford them:  notice of their potential liability within a fixed time window. 
The complaint also “commence[d] the action for all members of the class.”  American 
Pipe, 414 U.S., at 550.  Thus, when petitioner California Public Employees’ Retirement System 
(CalPERS) elected to exercise the right safeguarded by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
23(c)(2)(B)(v), i.e., the right to opt out of the class and proceed independently, CalPERS’ claim 
remained timely. . . .  Given the due process underpinning of the opt-out right, I resist rendering 
the right illusory for CalPERS and similarly situated class members.  I would therefore reverse 
the judgment of the Second Circuit.  Accordingly, I dissent from today’s decision, under which 
opting out cuts off any chance for recovery. 
I 
CalPERS’ claim against respondents was timely launched when the class representative 
filed a complaint pursuant to § 11 of the Securities Act, on behalf of all members of the 
described class, CalPERS among them. . . .  Filing the class complaint within three years of the 
date the securities specified in that complaint were offered to the public also satisfied § 13’s 
statute of repose. . . .  [W]hether CalPERS stayed in the class or eventually filed separately, 
respondents would have known, within the repose period, of their potential liability to all 
putative class members. 
A class complaint “notifies the defendants not only of the substantive claims being 
brought against them, but also of the number and generic identities of the potential plaintiffs who 
may participate in the judgment.” . . .  quoting American Pipe.  The class complaint filed against 
respondents provided that very notice:  It identified “the essential information necessary to 
determine both the subject matter and size of the prospective litigation,” the class of plaintiffs, 
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the offering documents, and the alleged untrue statements and misleading omissions in those 
documents.  “[A] defendant faced with [such] information about a potential liability to a class 
cannot be said to have reached a state of repose that should be protected.” 
When CalPERS elected to pursue individually the claims already stated in the class 
complaint against the same defendants, it simply took control of the piece of the action that had 
always belonged to it.  CalPERS’ statement of the same allegations in an individual complaint 
could not disturb anyone’s repose, for respondents could hardly be at rest once notified of the 
potential claimants and the precise false or misleading statements alleged to infect the 
registration statements at issue.  CalPERS’ decision to opt out did change two things:  (1) 
CalPERS positioned itself to exercise its constitutional right to go it alone, cutting loose from a 
monetary settlement it deemed insufficient; and (2) respondents had to deal with CalPERS and 
its attorneys in addition to the named plaintiff and class counsel.  Although those changes may 
affect how litigation subsequently plays out, they do not implicate the concerns that prompted § 
13’s repose period:  The class complaint disclosed the same information respondents would have 
received had each class member instead filed an individual complaint on the day the class 
complaint was filed. 
II 
Today’s decision disserves the investing public that § 11 was designed to protect.  The 
harshest consequences will fall on those class members, often least sophisticated, who fail to file 
a protective claim within the repose period.  Absent a protective claim filed within that period, 
those members stand to forfeit their constitutionally shielded right to opt out of the class and 
thereby control the prosecution of their own claims for damages. . . .  Because critical stages of 
securities class actions, including the class-certification decision, often occur years after the 
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filing of a class complaint, the risk is high that class members failing to file a protective claim 
will be saddled with inadequate representation or an inadequate judgment. 
The majority’s ruling will also gum up the works of class litigation.  Defendants will 
have an incentive to slow walk discovery and other precertification proceedings so the clock will 
run on potential opt outs.  Any class member with a material stake in a § 11 case, including every 
fiduciary who must safeguard investor assets, will have strong cause to file a protective claim, in 
a separate complaint or in a motion to intervene, before the three-year period expires. Such 
filings, by increasing the costs and complexity of the litigation, “substantially burden the courts.” 
Today’s decision impels courts and class counsel to take on a more active role in 
protecting class members’ opt-out rights.  As the repose period nears expiration, it should be 
incumbent on class counsel, guided by district courts, to notify class members about the 
consequences of failing to file a timely protective claim.  “At minimum, when notice goes out to 
a class beyond [§ 13’s limitations period], a district court will need to assess whether the notice 
[should] alert class members that opting out . . . would end [their] chance for recovery.” . . . 
* * * 
For the reasons stated, I would hold that the filing of the class complaint commenced 
CalPERS’ action under § 11 of the Securities Act, thereby satisfying § 13’s statute of repose.  
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Second Circuit. 
  




Secondary Liability and the Reach of Primary Liability Under Section 10(b) 
§ 6.03 Distinguishing Primary from Secondary Conduct 
[C] Primary Liability Under Rule 10b-5(a) and (c) 
  On page 350, add: 
LORENZO v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
United States Supreme Court 
____ U.S. ____, 139 S. Ct. 1094, 203 L. Ed. 2d 484 (2019) 
JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 makes it unlawful: 
“(a)  To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
“(b)  To make any untrue statement of a material fact . . . , or 
“(c)  To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as a fraud or deceit . . . 
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” 
In Janus Capital Groups, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135 (2011), we 
examined the second of these provisions, Rule 10b-5(b), which forbids the “mak[ing]” of “any 
untrue statement of a material fact.”  We held that the “maker of a statement is the person or 
entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including its content and whether and how to 
communicate it.”  We said that “[w]ithout control, a person or entity can merely suggest what to 
say, not ‘make’ a statement in its own right.”  And we illustrated our holding with an analogy:  
“[W]hen a speechwriter drafts a speech, the content is entirely within the control of the person 
who delivers it.  And it is the speaker who takes credit—or blame—for what is ultimately said.”  
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On the facts of Janus, this meant that an investment adviser who had merely “participat[ed] in 
the drafting of a false statement” “made” by another could not be held liable in a private action 
under subsection (b) of Rule 10b-5. 
In this case, we consider whether those who do not “make” statements (as Janus defined 
“make”), but who disseminate false or misleading statements to potential investors with the 
intent to defraud, can be found to have violated the other parts of Rule 10b-5, subsections (a) and 
(c), as well as related provisions of the securities laws, § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934, and § 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act of 1933. . . .  We believe that they can. 
I 
A 
For our purposes, the relevant facts are not in dispute.  Francis Lorenzo, the petitioner, 
was the director of investment banking at Charles Vista, LLC, a registered broker-dealer in 
Staten Island, New York.  Lorenzo’s only investment banking client at the time was 
Waste2Energy Holdings, Inc., a company developing technology to convert “solid waste” into 
“clean renewable energy.” 
In a June 2009 public filing, Waste2Energy stated that its total assets were worth about 
$14 million.  This figure included intangible assets, namely, intellectual property, valued at more 
than $10 million.  Lorenzo was skeptical of this valuation, later testifying that the intangibles 
were a “dead asset” because the technology “didn’t really work.” 
During the summer and early fall of 2009, Waste2Energy hired Lorenzo’s firm, Charles 
Vista, to sell to investors $15 million worth of debentures, a form of “debt secured only by the 
debtor’s earning power, not by a lien on any specific asset,” Black’s Law Dictionary 486 (10th 
ed. 2014). 
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In early October 2009, Waste2Energy publicly disclosed, and Lorenzo was told, that its 
intellectual property was worthless, that it had “‘w]rit[ten] off . . . all [of its] intangible assets,’” 
and that its total assets (as of March 31, 2009) amounted to $370,552. 
Shortly thereafter, on October 14, 2009, Lorenzo sent two e-mails to prospective 
investors describing the debenture offering.  According to later testimony by Lorenzo, he sent the 
e-mails at the direction of his boss, who supplied the content and “approved” the messages.  The 
e-mails described the investment in Waste2Energy as having “3 layers of protection,” including 
$10 million in “confirmed assets.”  The e-mails nowhere revealed the fact that Waste2Energy 
had publicly stated that its assets were in fact worth less than $400,000.  Lorenzo signed the e-
mails with his own name, he identified himself as “Vice President—Investment Banking,” and 
he invited the recipients to “call with any questions.” 
B 
In 2013, the Securities and Exchange Commission instituted proceedings against Lorenzo 
(along with his boss and Charles Vista).  The Commission charged that Lorenzo had violated 
Rule 10b-5, § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and § 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act.  Ultimately, the 
Commission found that Lorenzo had run afoul of these provisions by sending false and 
misleading statements to investors with intent to defraud.  As a sanction, it fined Lorenzo 
$15,000, ordered him to cease and desist from violating the securities laws, and barred him from 
working in the securities industry for life. 
Lorenzo appealed, arguing primarily that in sending the e-mails he lacked the intent 
required to establish a violation of Rule 10b-5, § 10(b), and § 17(a)(1), which we have 
characterized as “‘a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.’”  Aaron v. 
SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 686, and n. 5 (1980).  With one judge dissenting [now Justice Kavanaugh], 
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the Court of Appeals panel rejected Lorenzo’s lack-of-intent argument.  872 F.3d 578, 583 
(CADC 2017).  Lorenzo does not challenge the panel’s scienter finding. 
Lorenzo also argued that, in light of Janus, he could not be held liable under subsection 
(b) of Rule 10b-5.  The panel agreed.  Because his boss “asked Lorenzo to send the emails, 
supplied the central content, and approved the messages for distribution,” it was the boss that had 
“ultimate authority” over the content of the statement “and whether and how to communicate it.” 
Janus, 563 U.S., at 142.  (We took this case on the assumption that Lorenzo was not a “maker” 
under subsection (b) of Rule 10b-5, and do not revisit the court’s decision on this point.) 
The Court of Appeals nonetheless sustained (with one judge dissenting [Kavanaugh, J]) 
the Commission’s finding that, by knowingly disseminating false information to prospective 
investors,  Lorenzo  had  violated  other  parts of Rule 10b-5, subsections (a) and (c), as well as  
§ 10(b) and §17(a)(1). 
Lorenzo then filed a petition for certiorari in this Court.  We granted review to resolve 
disagreement about whether someone who is not a “maker” of a misstatement under Janus can 
nevertheless be found to have violated the other subsections of Rule 10b-5 and related provisions 
of the securities laws, when the only conduct involved concerns a misstatement. . . . 
II 
A 
At the outset, we review the relevant provisions of Rule 10b-5 and of the statutes.  As we 
have said, subsection (a) of the Rule makes it unlawful to “employ any device, scheme, or 
artifice to defraud.”  Subsection (b) makes it unlawful to “make any untrue statement of a 
material fact.”  And subsection (c) makes it unlawful to “engage in any act, practice, or course of 
business” that “operates . . . as a fraud or deceit.” 
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There are also two statutes at issue. Section 10b) makes it unlawful to “use or employ . . . 
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance” in contravention of Commission rules and 
regulations.  By its authority under that section, the Commission promulgated Rule 10b-5.  The 
second statutory provision is § 17(a), which, like Rule 10b-5, is organized into three subsections.  
Here, however, we consider only the first subsection, §17(a)(1), for this is the only subsection 
that the Commission charged Lorenzo with violating.  Like Rule 10b-5(a), 17(a)(1) makes it 
unlawful to “employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud.” 
B 
After examining the relevant language, precedent, and purpose, we conclude that 
(assuming other here-irrelevant legal requirements are met) dissemination of false or misleading 
statements  with intent to defraud can fall within the scope of subsections (a) and (c) of Rule 
10b-5, as well as the relevant statutory provisions.  In our view, that is so even if the 
disseminator did not “make” the statements and consequently falls outside subsection (b) of the 
Rule. 
It would seem obvious that the words in these provisions are, as ordinarily used, 
sufficiently broad to include within their scope the dissemination of false or misleading 
information with the intent to defraud.  By sending emails he understood to contain material 
untruths, Lorenzo “employ[ed]” a “device,” “scheme,” and “artifice to defraud” within the 
meaning of subsection (a) of the Rule, § 10(b), and § 17(a)(1).  By the same conduct, he 
“engage[d] in a[n] act, practice, or course of business” that “operate[d] . . . as a fraud or deceit” 
under subsection (c) of the Rule.  Recall that Lorenzo does not challenge the appeals court’s 
scienter finding, so we take for granted that he sent the emails with “intent to deceive, 
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manipulate, or defraud” the recipients.  Under the circumstances, it is difficult to see how his 
actions could escape the reach of those provisions. 
Resort to dictionary definitions only strengthens this conclusion.  A “‘device,’” we have 
observed, is simply “‘[t]hat which is devised, or formed by design’”; a “‘scheme’” is a 
“‘project,’” “‘plan[,] or program of something to be done’”; and an “‘artifice’” is “‘an artful 
stratagem or trick.’” . . . (quoting Webster’s International Dictionary . . .).  By these lights, 
dissemination of false or misleading material is easily an “artful stratagem” or a “plan,” 
“devised” to defraud an investor under subsection (a).  See Rule 10b-5(a) (making it unlawful to 
“employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud”)’ § 17(a)(1) (same).  The words “act” and 
“practice” in subsection (c) are similarly expansive.  Webster’s Second 25 (defining “act” as “a 
doing” or a “thing done”)’ id., at 1937 (defining “practice” as an “action” or “deed”)’ see Rule 
10b-5(c) (making it unlawful to “engage in a[n] act, practice, or course of business” that 
“operates . . . as a fraud or deceit”). 
These provisions capture a wide range of conduct.  Applying them may present difficult 
problems of scope in borderline cases.  Purpose, precedent, and circumstance could lead to 
narrowing their reach in other contexts.  But we see nothing borderline about this case, where the 
relevant conduct (as found by the Commission) consists of disseminating false or misleading 
information to prospective investors with the intent to defraud.  And while one can readily 
imagine other actors tangentially involved in dissemination—say, a mailroom clerk—for whom 
liability would typically be inappropriate, the petitioner in this case sent false statements directly 
to investors, invited them to follow up with questions, and did so in his capacity as vice president 
of an investment banking company. 




Lorenzo argues that, despite the natural meaning of these provisions, they should not 
reach his conduct.  This is so, he says, because the only way to be liable for false statements is 
through those provisions that refer specifically to false statements.  Other provisions, he says, 
concern “scheme liability claims” and are violated only when conduct other than misstatements 
is involved.  Thus, only those who “make” untrue statements under subsection (b) can violate 
Rule 10b-5 in connection with statements.  (Similarly, § 17(a)(2) would be the sole route for 
finding liability for statements under § 17(a).)  Holding to the contrary, he and the dissent insist, 
would render subsection (b) of Rule 10b-5 “superfluous.” . . . . 
The premise of this argument is that each of these provisions should be read as governing 
different, mutually exclusive, spheres of conduct.  But this Court and the Commission have long 
recognized considerable overlap among the subsections of the Rule and related provisions of the 
securities laws. . . .  As we have explained, these laws marked the “first experiment in federal 
regulation of the securities industry.”  SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 
180, 198 (1963).  It is “understandable, therefore,” that “in declaring certain practices unlawful,” 
it was thought prudent “to include both a general proscription against fraudulent and deceptive 
practices and, out of an abundance of caution, a specific proscription against nondisclosure” even 
though “a specific proscription against nondisclosure” might in other circumstances be deemed 
“surplusage.”  “Each succeeding prohibition” was thus “meant to cover additional kinds of 
illegalities—not to narrow the reach of the prior sections.”  We have found “‘no warrant for 
narrowing  alternative  provisions . . . adopted  with the purpose of affording added 
safeguards.’”. . . And since its earliest days, the Commission has not viewed these provisions as 
mutually exclusive.  See, e.g., In re R. D. Bayly & Co., 19 S. E. C. 773 (1945) (finding violations 
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of what would become Rules 10b-5(b) and (c) based on the same misrepresentations and 
omissions). . . . 
The idea that each subsection of Rule 10b-5 governs a separate type of conduct is also 
difficult to reconcile with the language of subsections (a) and (c).  It should go without saying 
that at least some conduct amounts to “employ[ing]” a “device, scheme, or artifice to defraud” 
under subsection (a) as well as “engag[ing] in a[n] act . . . which operates . . . as a fraud” under 
subsection (c).  In Affiliated Ute, for instance, we described the “defendants’ activities” as falling 
“within the very language of one or the other of those subparagraphs, a ‘course of business’ or a 
‘device, scheme, or artifice’ that operated as a fraud.”  406 U.S., at 153.  (The dissent, for its 
part, offers no account of how the superfluity problems that motivate its interpretation can be 
avoided where subsections (a) and (c) are concerned.) 
Coupled with the Rule’s expansive language, which readily embraces the conduct before 
us, this considerable overlap suggests we should not hesitate to hold that Lorenzo’s conduct ran 
afoul of subsections (a) and (c), as well as the related statutory provisions.  Our conviction is 
strengthened by the fact that we here confront behavior that, though plainly fraudulent, might 
otherwise fall outside the scope of the Rule.  Lorenzo’s view that subsection (b), the making-
false-statements provisions, exclusively regulates conduct involving false or misleading 
statements would mean those who disseminate false statements with the intent to cheat investors 
might escape liability under the Rule altogether.  But using false representations to induce the 
purchase of securities would seem a paradigmatic example of securities fraud.  We do not know 
why Congress or the Commission would have wanted to disarm enforcement in this way.  And 
we cannot easily reconcile Lorenzo’s approach with the basic purpose behind these laws:  “to 
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substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve 
a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry.”…. 
III 
Lorenzo and the dissent make a few other important arguments.  They contend that 
applying subsections (a) or (c) of Rule 10-5 to conduct like his would render our decision in 
Janus . . . . “a dead letter.”  But we do not see how that is so.  In Janus, we considered the 
language in subsection (b), which prohibits the “mak[ing]” of “any untrue statement of a material 
fact.”  We held that the “maker” of a “statement” is the “person or entity with ultimate authority 
over the statement.”  And we found that subsection (b) did not (under the circumstances) cover 
an investment adviser who helped draft misstatements issued by a different entity that controlled 
the statements’ content.  We said nothing about the Rule’s application to the dissemination of 
false or misleading information.  And we can assume that Janus would remain relevant (and 
preclude liability) where an individual neither makes nor disseminates false information—
provided, of course, that the individual is not involved in some other form of fraud. 
Next, Lorenzo points to the statute’s “aiding and abetting” provision.  15 U.S.C. § 78t(e).  
This provision, enforceable only by the Commission (and not by private parties), makes it 
unlawful to “knowingly or recklessly . . . provid[e] substantial assistance to another person” who 
violates the Rule. . . .  Lorenzo claims that imposing primary liability upon his conduct would 
erase or at least weaken what is otherwise a clear distinction between primary and secondary 
(i.e., aiding and abetting) liability.  He emphasizes that, under today’s holding, a disseminator 
might be a primary offender with respect to subsection (a) of Rule 10b-5 (by employing a 
“scheme” to “defraud”) and also secondarily liable as an aider and abettor with respect to 
subsection (b) (by providing substantial assistance to one who “makes” a false statement. . . . 
Copyright © 2020 Carolina Academic Press, LLC. All rights reserved.
-26- 
 
We do not believe, however, that our decision creates a serious anomaly or otherwise 
weakens the distinction between primary and secondary liability.  For one thing, it is hardly 
unusual for the same conduct to be a primary violation with respect to one offense and aiding 
and abetting with respect to another.  John, for example, might sell Bill an unregistered firearm 
in order to help Bill rob a bank, under circumstances that make him primarily liable for the gun 
sale and secondarily liable for the bank robbery. 
For another, the cases to which Lorenzo refers do not help his cause.  Take Central Bank, 
where we held that Rule 10b-5’s private right of action does not permit suits against secondary 
violators.  The holding of Central Bank, we have said, suggests the need for a “clean line” 
between conduct that constitutes a primary violation of Rule 10b-5 and conduct that amounts to a 
secondary violation.  Thus, in Janus, we sought an interpretation of “make” that could neatly 
divide primary violators and actors too far removed from the ultimate decision to communicate a 
statement.  The line we adopt today is just as administrable:  Those who disseminate false 
statements with intent to defraud are primarily liable under Rules 10b-5(a) and (c), § 10(b), and  
§ 17(a)(1), even if they are secondarily liable under Rule 10b-5(b).  Lorenzo suggests that 
classifying dissemination as a primary violation would inappropriately subject peripheral players 
in fraud (including him, naturally) to substantial liability.  We suspect the investors who received 
Lorenzo’s e-mails would not view the deception so favorably.  And as Central Bank itself made 
clear, even a bit participant in the securities markets “may be liable as a primary violator under 
[Rule] 10b-5” so long as “all of the requirements for primary liability . . . are met.” . . . 
Lorenzo’s reliance on Stoneridge is even further afield.  There, we held that private 
plaintiffs could not bring suit against certain securities defendants based on undisclosed 
deceptions upon which the plaintiffs could not have relied.  552 U.S., at 159.  But the 
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Commission, unlike private parties, need not show reliance in its enforcement actions.  And even 
supposing reliance were relevant here, Lorenzo’s conduct involved the direct transmission of 
false statements to prospective investors intended to induce reliance—far from the kind of 
concealed fraud at issue in Stoneridge. 
As for Lorenzo’s suggestion that those like him ought to be held secondarily liable, this 
offer will, far too often, prove illusory.  In instances where a “maker” of a false statement does 
not violate subsection (b) of the Rule (perhaps because he lacked the necessary intent), a 
disseminator of those statements, even one knowingly engaged in an egregious fraud, could not 
be held to have violated the “aiding and abetting” statute.  That is because the statute insists that 
there be a primary violator to whom the secondary violator provided “substantial assistance.”  15 
U. S. C. § 78t(e).  And the latter can be “deemed to be in violation” of the provision only “to the 
same extent as the person to whom such assistance is provided.”  In other words, if Acme Corp. 
could not be held liable under subsection (b) for a statement it made, then a knowing 
disseminator of those statements could not be held liable for aiding and abetting Acme under 
subsection (b).  And if, as Lorenzo claims, the disseminator has not primarily violated other parts 
of Rule 10b-5, then such a fraud, whatever its intent or consequences, might escape liability 
altogether. 
That is not what Congress intended.  Rather, Congress intended to root out all manner of 
fraud in the securities industry.  And it gave to the Commission the tools to accomplish that job. 
* * * 
For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed. 
So ordered. 
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JUSTICE THOMAS, with whom JUSTICE GORSUCH joins, dissenting. 
In Janus Capital Group, Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U. S. 135 (2011), we drew 
a clear line between primary and secondary liability in fraudulent-misstatement cases:  A person 
does not “make” a fraudulent misstatement within the meaning of Securities and Exchange  
Commission (SEC) Rule 10b-5(b)—and thus is not primarily liable for the statement—if the 
person lacks “ultimate authority over the statement.”  Such a person could, however, be liable as 
an aider and abettor under principles of secondary liability. 
Today, the Court eviscerates this distinction by holding that a person who has not “made” 
a fraudulent misstatement can nevertheless be primarily liable for it.  Because the majority 
misconstrues the securities laws and flouts our precedent in a way that is likely to have far-
reaching consequences, I respectfully dissent. 
. . . . 
The majority’s approach contradicts our precedent in two distinct ways. 
First, the majority’s opinion renders Janus a dead letter.  In Janus, we held that liability 
under Rule 10b-5(b) was limited to the “make[r]” of the statement and that “[o]ne who prepares 
or  publishes  a  statement  on behalf of another is not its maker” within the meaning of Rule 
10b-5(b).  It is undisputed here that Lorenzo was not the maker of the fraudulent misstatements.  
The majority nevertheless finds primary liability under different provisions of Rule 10b-5, 
without any real effort to reconcile its decision with Janus.  Although it “assume[s] that Janus 
would remain relevant (and preclude liability) where an individual neither makes nor 
disseminates false information,” in the next breath the majority states that this would be true only 
if “the individual is not involved in some other form of fraud.”  Given that, under the majority’s 
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rule, administrative acts undertaken in connection with a fraudulent misstatement qualify as 
“other form[s] of fraud,” the majority’s supposed preservation of Janus is illusory. 
Second, the majority fails to maintain a clear line between primary and secondary 
liability in fraudulent-misstatement cases.  Maintaining this distinction is important because, as 
the majority notes, there is no private right of action against mere aiders and abettors. . . .  Here, 
however, the majority does precisely what we declined to do in Janus:  impose broad liability for 
fraudulent misstatements in a way that makes the category of aiders and abettors in these cases 
“almost nonexistent.”  If Lorenzo’s conduct here qualifies for primary liability under § 10(b) and 
Rule 10b-5(a) or (c), then virtually any person who assists with the making of a fraudulent 
misstatement will be primarily liable and thereby subject not only to SEC enforcement, but 
private lawsuits. 
. . . . 
The Court attempts to cabin the implications of its holding by highlighting several facts 
that supposedly would distinguish this case from a case involving a secretary or other person 
“tangentially involved in disseminat[ing]” fraudulent misstatements.  None of these distinctions 
withstands scrutiny.  The fact that Lorenzo “sent false statements directly to investors” in e-mails 
that “invited [investors] to follow up with questions,” puts him in precisely the same position as 
a secretary asked to send an identical message from her e-mail account.  And under the unduly 
capacious interpretation that the majority gives to the securities laws, I do not see why it would 
matter whether the sender is the “vice president of an investment banking company” or a 
secretary—if the sender knowingly sent false statements, the sender apparently would be 
primarily liable.  To be sure, I agree with the majority that liability would be “inappropriate” for 
a secretary put in a situation similar to Lorenzo’s.  But I can discern no legal principle in the 
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majority opinion that would preclude the secretary from being pursued for primary violations of 
the securities laws. 
* * * 
Instead of blurring the distinction between primary and secondary liability, I would hold 
that Lorenzo’s conduct did not amount to a primary violation of the securities laws and reverse 
the judgment of the Court of Appeals.  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. 
  





§ 7.06  Tipper-Tippee Liability Under Section 10(b) 
 On page 419, add: 
SALMAN v. UNITED STATES 
United States Supreme Court 
____ U.S. ____, 137 S. Ct. 420, 196 L. Ed. 2d 351 (2016) 
JUSTICE ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court. 
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission’s Rule 10b-5 prohibit undisclosed trading on inside corporate information by 
individuals who are under a duty of trust and confidence that prohibits them from secretly using 
such information for their personal advantage. . . .  Individuals under this duty may face criminal 
and civil liability for trading on inside information (unless they make appropriate disclosures 
ahead of time). 
These persons also may not tip inside information to others for trading.  The tippee 
acquires the tipper’s duty to disclose or abstain from trading if the tippee knows the information 
was disclosed in breach of the tipper’s duty, and the tippee may commit securities fraud by 
trading in disregard of that knowledge.  In Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), this Court 
explained that a tippee’s liability for trading on inside information hinges on whether the tipper 
breached a fiduciary duty by disclosing the information.  A tipper breaches such a fiduciary duty, 
we held, when the tipper discloses the inside information for a personal benefit.  And, we went 
on to say, a jury can infer a personal benefit — and thus a breach of the tipper’s duty — where 
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the tipper receives something of value in exchange for the tip or “makes a gift of confidential 
information to a trading relative or friend.”. . . 
Petitioner Bassam Salman challenges his convictions for conspiracy and insider trading.  
Salman received lucrative trading tips from an extended family member, who had received the 
information from Salman’s brother-in-law.  Salman then traded on the information.  He argues 
that he cannot be held liable as a tippee because the tipper (his brother-in-law) did not personally 
receive money or property in exchange for the tips and thus did not personally benefit from 
them.  The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that Dirks allowed the jury to infer that the 
tipper here breached a duty because he made a ‘gift of confidential information to a trading 
relative.’  792 F.3d 1087, 1092 (CA9 2015). . . .  Because the Court of Appeals properly applied 
Dirks, we affirm the judgment below. 
I 
Maher Kara was an investment banker in Citigroup’s healthcare investment banking 
group.  He dealt with highly confidential information about mergers and acquisitions involving 
Citigroup’s clients.  Maher enjoyed a close relationship with his older brother, Mounir Kara 
(known as Michael).  After Maher started at Citigroup, he began discussing aspects of his job 
with Michael.  At first he relied on Michael’s chemistry background to help him grasp scientific 
concepts relevant to his new job.  Then, while their father was battling cancer, the brothers 
discussed companies that dealt with innovative cancer treatment and pain management 
techniques.  Michael began to trade on the information Maher shared with him.  At first, Maher 
was unaware of his brother’s trading activity, but eventually he began to suspect that it was 
taking place. 
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Ultimately, Maher began to assist Michael’s trading by sharing inside information with 
his brother about pending mergers and acquisitions.  Maher sometimes used code words to 
communicate corporate information to his brother.  Other times, he shared inside information 
about deals he was not working on in order to avoid detection.  Without his younger brother’s 
knowledge, Michael fed the information to others — including Salman, Michael’s friend and 
Maher’s brother-in-law.  By the time the authorities caught on, Salman had made over $1.5 
million in profits that he split with another relative who executed trades via a brokerage account 
on Salman’s behalf. 
Salman was indicted on one count of conspiracy to commit securities fraud and four 
counts of securities fraud. . . .  Facing charges of their own, both Maher and Michael pleaded 
guilty and testified at Salman’s trial. 
The evidence at trial established that Maher and Michael enjoyed a “very close 
relationship.”  Maher “love[d] [his] brother very much,” Michael was like “a second father to 
Maher,” and Michael was the best man at Maher’s wedding to Salman’s sister.  Maher testified 
that he shared inside information with his brother to benefit him and with the expectation that his 
brother would trade on it.  While Maher explained that he disclosed the information in large part 
to appease Michael (who pestered him incessantly for it), he also testified that he tipped his 
brother to “help him” and to “fulfil[l] whatever needs he had.”  For instance, Michael once called 
Maher and told him that “he needed a favor.”  Maher offered his brother money but Michael 
asked for information instead.  Maher then disclosed an upcoming acquisition.  Although he 
instantly regretted the tip and called his brother back to implore him not to trade, Maher expected 
his brother to do so anyway. . . . 
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For his part, Michael told the jury that his brother’s tips gave him “timely information 
that the average person does not have access to” and “access to stocks, options, and what have 
you, that I can capitalize on, that the average person would never have or dream of.”  Michael 
testified that he became friends with Salman when Maher was courting Salman’s sister and later 
began sharing Maher’s tips with Salman.  As he explained at trial, “any time a major deal came 
in, [Salman] was the first on my phone list.”  Michael also testified that he told Salman that the 
information was coming from Maher. . . . 
After a jury trial in the Northern District of California, Salman was convicted on all 
counts.  He was sentenced to 36 months of imprisonment, three years of supervised release, and 
over $750,000 in restitution.  After his motion for a new trial was denied, Salman appealed to the 
Ninth Circuit.  While his appeal was pending, the Second Circuit issued its opinion in United 
States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2014). . . .  There, the Second Circuit reversed the convictions 
of two portfolio managers who traded on inside information.  The Newman defendants were 
“several steps removed from the corporate insiders” and the court found that “there was no 
evidence that either was aware of the source of the inside information.”  The court acknowledged 
that Dirks and Second Circuit case law allow a factfinder to infer a personal benefit to the tipper 
from a gift of confidential information to a trading relative or friend.  But the court concluded 
that, “[t]o the extent” Dirks permits “such an inference,” the inference “is impermissible in the 
absence of proof of a meaningfully close personal relationship that generates an exchange that is 
objective, consequential, and represents at least a potential gain of a pecuniary or similarly 
valuable nature.” . . . 
Pointing to Newman, Salman argued that his conviction should be reversed.  While the 
evidence established that Maher made a gift of trading information to Michael and that Salman 
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knew it, there was no evidence that Maher received anything of “a pecuniary or similarly 
valuable nature” in exchange — or that Salman knew of any such benefit.  The Ninth Circuit 
disagreed and affirmed Salman’s conviction.  792 F.3d 1087.  The court reasoned that the case 
was governed by Dirks’s holding that a tipper benefits personally by making a gift of 
confidential information to a trading relative or friend.  Indeed, Maher’s disclosures to Michael 
were “precisely the gift of confidential information to a trading relative that Dirks envisioned.”  
792 F.3d at 1092. . . .  To the extent Newman went further and required additional gain to the 
tipper in cases involving gifts of confidential information to family and friends, the Ninth Circuit 
“decline[d] to follow it.” . . . 
We granted certiorari to resolve the tension between the Second Circuit’s Newman 
decision and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case. . . .[1] 
II 
A 
In this case, Salman contends that an insider’s “gift of confidential information to a 
trading relative or friend,” is not enough to establish securities fraud.  Instead, Salman argues, a 
tipper does not personally benefit unless the tipper’s goal in disclosing inside information is to 
obtain money, property, or something of tangible value.  He claims that our insider-trading 
 
[1] Dirk’s v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), established the personal-benefit framework in a case brought under the 
classical theory of insider-trading liability, which applies “when a corporate insider” or his tippee “trades in the 
securities of [the tipper’s] corporation on the basis of material, nonpublic information.”  United States v. O’Hagan, 
521 U. S. 642, 651-652 (1997).  In such a case, the defendant breaches a duty to, and takes advantage of, the 
shareholders of his corporation.  By contrast, the misappropriation theory holds that a person commits securities 
fraud “when he misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to 
the source of the information” such as an employer or client.  Id., at 652.  In such a case, the defendant breaches a 
duty to, and defrauds, the source of the information, as opposed to the shareholders of his corporation.  The Court of 
Appeals observed that this is a misappropriation case, 792 F.3d, 1087, 1092, n. 4 (CA9 2015), while the Government 
represents that both theories apply on the facts of this case. . . .  We need not resolve the question.  The parties do 
not dispute that Dirks’s personal-benefit analysis applies in both classical and misappropriation cases, so we will 
proceed on the assumption that it does. 
Copyright © 2020 Carolina Academic Press, LLC. All rights reserved.
-36- 
 
precedents, and the cases those precedents cite, involve situations in which the insider exploited 
confidential information for the insider’s own “tangible monetary profit.”  He suggests that his 
position is reinforced by our criminal-fraud precedents outside of the insider-trading context, 
because those cases confirm that a fraudster must personally obtain money or property.  More 
broadly, Salman urges that defining a gift as a personal benefit renders the insider-trading 
offense indeterminate and overbroad:  indeterminate, because liability may turn on facts such as 
the closeness of the relationship between tipper and tippee and the tipper’s purpose for 
disclosure; and overbroad, because the Government may avoid having to prove a concrete 
personal benefit by simply arguing that the tipper meant to give a gift to the tippee.  He also 
argues that we should interpret Dirks’s standard narrowly so as to avoid constitutional concerns.  
Finally, Salman contends that gift situations create especially troubling problems for remote 
tippees —that is, tippees who receive inside information from another tippee, rather than the 
tipper — who may have no knowledge of the relationship between the original tipper and tippee 
and thus may not know why the tipper made the disclosure. . . . 
The Government disagrees and argues that a gift of confidential information to anyone, 
not just a “trading relative or friend,” is enough to prove securities fraud. . . .  Under the 
Government’s view, a tipper personally benefits whenever the tipper discloses confidential 
trading information for a noncorporate purpose.  Accordingly, a gift to a friend, a family 
member, or anyone else would support the inference that the tipper exploited the trading value of 
inside information for personal purposes and thus personally benefited from the disclosure.  The 
Government claims to find support for this reading in Dirks and the precedents on which Dirks 
relied. . . . 
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The Government also argues that Salman’s concerns about unlimited and indeterminate 
liability for remote tippees are significantly alleviated by other statutory elements that 
prosecutors must satisfy to convict a tippee for insider trading.  The Government observes that, 
in order to establish a defendant’s criminal liability as a tippee, it must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the tipper expected that the information being disclosed would be used in 
securities trading.  The Government also notes that, to establish a defendant’s criminal liability 
as a tippee, it must prove that the tippee knew that the tipper breached a duty — in other words, 
that the tippee knew that the tipper disclosed the information for a personal benefit and that the 
tipper expected trading to ensue. . . . 
B 
We adhere to Dirks, which easily resolves the narrow issue presented here. 
In Dirks, we explained that a tippee is exposed to liability for trading on inside 
information only if the tippee participates in a breach of the tipper’s fiduciary duty.  Whether the 
tipper breached that duty depends “in large part on the purpose of the disclosure” to the tippee.  
“[T]he test,” we explained, “is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, 
from his disclosure.”  Thus, the disclosure of confidential information without personal benefit is 
not enough.  In determining whether a tipper derived a personal benefit, we instructed courts to 
“focus on objective criteria, i.e., whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit 
from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will translate into 
future earnings.”  This personal benefit can “often” be inferred “from objective facts and 
circumstances,” we explained, such as “a relationship between the insider and the recipient that 
suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit the particular recipient.”  In 
particular, we held that “[t]he elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic 
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information also exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading 
relative or friend.”  Ibid.  (emphasis added).  In such cases, “[t]he tip and trade resemble trading 
by the insider followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.”  We then applied this gift-giving 
principle to resolve Dirks itself, finding it dispositive that the tippers “received no monetary or 
personal benefit” from their tips to Dirks, “nor was their purpose to make a gift of valuable 
information to Dirks.” 
Our discussion of gift giving resolves this case.  Maher, the tipper, provided inside 
information to a close relative, his brother Michael.  Dirks makes clear that a tipper breaches a 
fiduciary duty by making a gift of confidential information to “a trading relative,” and that rule is 
sufficient to resolve the case at hand.  As Salman’s counsel acknowledged at oral argument, 
Maher would have breached his duty had he personally traded on the information here himself 
then given the proceeds as a gift to his brother.  It is obvious that Maher would personally benefit 
in that situation.  But Maher effectively achieved the same result by disclosing the information to 
Michael, and allowing him to trade on it.  Dirks appropriately prohibits that approach, as well.  
Cf. [Dirks] 463 U.S., at 659 (holding that “insiders [are] forbidden” both “from personally using 
undisclosed corporate information to their advantage” and from “giv[ing] such information to an 
outsider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the information for their personal gain”),  
Dirks specifies that when a tipper gives inside information to “a trading relative or friend,” the 
jury can infer that the tipper meant to provide the equivalent of a cash gift.  In such situations, 
the tipper benefits personally because giving a gift of trading information is the same thing as 
trading by the tipper followed by a gift of the proceeds.  Here, by disclosing confidential 
information as a gift to his brother with the expectation that he would trade on it, Maher 
breached his duty of trust and confidence to Citigroup and its clients — a duty Salman acquired, 
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and breached himself, by trading on the information with full knowledge that it had been 
improperly disclosed. 
To the extent the Second Circuit held that the tipper must also receive something of a 
“pecuniary or similarly valuable nature” in exchange for a gift to family or friends, Newman 773 
F.3d, at 452, we agree with the Ninth Circuit that this requirement is inconsistent with Dirks. 
C 
Salman points out that many insider-trading cases — including several that Dirks cited — 
involved insiders who personally profited through the misuse of trading information.  But this 
observation does not undermine the test Dirks articulated and applied.  Salman also cites a 
sampling of our criminal-fraud decisions construing other federal fraud statutes, suggesting that 
they stand for the proposition that fraud is not consummated unless the defendant obtains money 
or property. . . .  Assuming that these cases are relevant to our construction of § 10(b) (a 
proposition the Government forcefully disputes), nothing in them undermines the commonsense 
point we made in Dirks.  Making a gift of inside information to a relative like Michael is little 
different from trading on the information, obtaining the profits, and doling them out to the 
trading relative.  The tipper benefits either way.  The facts of this case illustrate the point:  In one 
of their tipper-tippee interactions, Michael asked Maher for a favor, declined Maher’s offer of 
money, and instead requested and received lucrative trading information. 
We reject Salman’s argument that Dirks’s gift-giving standard is unconstitutionally vague 
as applied to this case.  Dirks created a simple and clear “guiding principle” for determining 
tippee liability, and Salman has not demonstrated that either § 10(b) itself or the Dirks gift-giving 
standard “leav[e] grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime” or are 
plagued by “hopeless indeterminacy.” . . .  At most, Salman shows that in some factual 
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circumstances assessing liability for gift-giving will be difficult.  That alone cannot render 
“shapeless” a federal criminal prohibition, for even clear rules “produce close cases.”  We also 
reject Salman’s appeal to the rule of lenity, as he has shown “no grievous ambiguity or 
uncertainty that would trigger the rule’s application.” . . .  To the contrary, Salman’s conduct is 
in the heartland of Dirks’s rule concerning gifts.  It remains the case that “[d]etermining whether 
an insider personally benefits from a particular disclosure, a question of fact, will not always be 
easy for courts.”  But there is no need for us to address those difficult cases today, because this 
case involves “precisely the gift of confidential information to a trading relative” that Dirks 
envisioned. . . . 
III 
Salman’s jury was properly instructed that a personal benefit includes “the benefit one 
would obtain from simply making a gift of confidential information to a trading relative.”  As the 
Court of Appeals noted, “the Government presented direct evidence that the disclosure was 
intended as a gift of market-sensitive information.”  And, as Salman conceded below, this 
evidence is sufficient to sustain his conviction under our reading of Dirks. . . .  Accordingly, the  
Ninth Circuit’s judgment is affirmed. 
____________________ 
Securities Fraud Criminal Statutes (Title 18 U.S. Code) — No Personal Benefit 
Required to be Proven.  In perhaps a surprising decision, United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 
19 (2d Cir. 2019), the Second Circuit held that the Dirks personal benefit test does not apply in 
criminal prosecutions under the (Title 18 U.S. Code) securities fraud and wire fraud statutes.  
Reasoning that these criminal statutes have a more expansive scope than Section 10(b) of the 
Securities Exchange Act, the court therefore concluded that prosecutors have a broader 
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enforcement arsenal to address securities fraud, including insider trading.  Accordingly, the 
Second Circuit declined “to graft the Dirks personal benefit test onto the elements of Title 18 
securities fraud.”  Hence, to a prosecutor’s delight, the “government may avoid the personal 
benefit test altogether by prosecuting insider trading with less difficulty under the Title 18 fraud 
statutes — particularly the Title 18 securities fraud statute …”  Id. at 37.  The consequence of 
this decision is that, as the law now stands in the Second Circuit with respect to tipper-tippee 
liability, it is easier for the Department of Justice to procure a criminal conviction than it is for 
the SEC or a plaintiff in private litigation to win its case.  An excerpt of this decision follows.  
These consolidated appeals require us to consider whether the federal wire 
fraud, securities fraud, and conversion statutes, codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343, 
1348, and 641, respectively, reach misappropriation of a government agency’s 
confidential non-public information relating to its contemplated rules.  Defendants 
David Blasczak, Theodore Huber, Robert Olan, and Christopher Worrall were 
charged with violating these statutes — and with engaging in securities fraud in 
violation of Section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), 
and SEC Rule 10b-5 (“Title 15 securities fraud”) — by misappropriating 
confidential nonpublic information from the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services (“CMS”).  The indictment principally alleged that CMS employees, 
including Worrall, disclosed the agency’s confidential information to Blaszczak, a 
“political intelligence” consultant for hedge funds, who in turn tipped the 
information to Huber and Olan, employees of the healthcare-focused hedge fund 
Deerfield Management Company, L.P. (“Deerfield”), which traded on it.  After a 
one-month trial before the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
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New York (Kaplan, J.), a jury found Defendants guilty of wire fraud, conversion, 
and, with the exception of Worrall, Title 18 securities fraud and conspiracy.  The 
jury acquitted Defendants on all counts alleging Title 15 securities fraud. 
Defendants now challenge their convictions on various grounds.  For the 
reasons set forth below, we reject these challenges.  In doing so, we hold, inter 
alia, that (1) confidential government information such as the CMS information at 
issue here may constitute “property” in the hands of the government for purposes 
of the wire fraud and Title 18 securities fraud statutes, and (2) the “personal-
benefit” test established in Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983), does not apply to 
these Title 18 fraud statutes.  Because we also discern no prejudicial error with 
respect to the remaining issues raised on appeal, we affirm the judgments of the 
district court. 
…. 
B.  Whether Dirks v. SEC Applies to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1343 and 1348 
Under Dirks, an insider may not be convicted of Title 15 securities fraud 
unless the government proves that he breached a duty of trust and confidence by 
disclosing material, nonpublic information in exchange for a “personal benefit.”  
Similarly, a tippee may not be convicted of such fraud unless he utilized the 
inside information knowing that it had been obtained in breach of the insider’s 
duty.  Here, Defendants claim that the district court erred by not instructing the 
jury that Dirks’s personal-benefit test also applied to the wire fraud and Title 18 
securities fraud counts.  In essence, Defendants argue that the term “defraud” 
should be construed to have the same meaning across the Title 18 fraud 
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provisions and Rule 10b-5, so that the elements of insider-trading fraud are the 
same under each of these provisions.  We disagree. 
We begin by noting what the Title 18 fraud statutes and Title 15 fraud 
provisions have in common:  their text does not mention a “personal benefit” test.  
Rather, these provisions prohibit, with certain variations, schemes to “defraud.”  
…  For each of these provisions, the term “defraud” encompasses the so-called 
“embezzlement” or “misappropriation” theory of fraud …  According to this 
theory, “[t]he concept of “fraud” includes the act of embezzlement, which is “the 
fraudulent appropriation to one’s own use of the money or goods entrusted to 
one’s care by another.”  The undisclosed misappropriation of confidential 
information, in breach of a fiduciary or similar duty of trust and confidence, 
“constitutes fraud akin to embezzlement.” 
While the Title 18 fraud statutes and Title 15 fraud provisions thus share 
similar text and proscribe similar theories of fraud, these common features have 
little to do with the personal-benefit test.  Rather, the personal-benefit test is a 
judge-made doctrine premised on the Exchange Act’s statutory purpose.  As Dirks 
explained, in order to protect the free flow of information into the securities 
markets, Congress enacted the Title 15 fraud provisions with the limited “purpose 
of … eliminat[ing] [the] use of insider information for personal advantage.” 463 
U.S. at 662 (emphasis added).  Dirks effectuated this purpose by holding that an 
insider could not breach his fiduciary duties by tipping confidential information 
unless he did so in exchange for a personal benefit…. 
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But once untethered from the statutory context in which it arose, the 
personal-benefit test finds no support in the embezzlement theory of fraud 
recognized [by the Supreme Court].  In the context of embezzlement, there is no 
additional requirement that an insider breach a duty to the owner of the property, 
since “it is impossible for a person to embezzle the money of another without 
committing a fraud upon him” … Because a breach of duty is thus inherent in [the 
Supreme Court’s] formulation of embezzlement, there is likewise no additional 
requirement that the government prove a breach of duty in a specific manner, let 
alone through evidence that an insider tipped confidential information in 
exchange for a personal benefit ….  In short, because the personal-benefit test is 
not grounded in the embezzlement theory of fraud, but rather depends entirely on 
the purpose of the Exchange Act, we decline to extend Dirks beyond the context 
of that statute. 
Our conclusion is the same for both the wire fraud and Title 18 securities 
fraud statutes.  While it is true that Section 1348 of Title 18, unlike the wire fraud 
statute, concerns the general subject matter of securities law, Section 1348 and the 
Exchange Act do not share the same statutory purpose.  Indeed, Section 1348 was 
added to the criminal code by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 in large part to 
overcome the “technical legal requirements” of the Title 15 fraud provisions.  S. 
Rep. No. 107-146, at 6.  In particular, Congress intended for Section 1348 to 
“supplement the patchwork of existing technical securities law violations with a 
more general and less technical provision, with elements and intent requirements 
comparable to current bank fraud and health care fraud statutes.”  S. Rep. No. 
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107-146, at 14.  Given that Section 1348 was intended to provide prosecutors with 
a different — and broader — enforcement mechanism to address securities fraud 
than what had been previously provided in the Title 15 fraud provisions, we 
decline to graft the Dirks personal-benefit test onto the elements of Title 18 
securities fraud. 
Finally, Defendants argue that we should extend Dirks beyond the Title 15 
fraud provisions because otherwise the government may avoid the personal-
benefit test altogether by prosecuting insider-trading fraud with less difficulty 
under the Title 18 fraud statutes — particularly the Title 18 securities fraud 
statute, which (unlike the wire fraud statute) does not require proof that wires 
were used to carry out the fraud.  But whatever the force of this argument as a 
policy matter, we may not rest our interpretation of the Title 18 fraud provisions 
“on such enforcement policy considerations.”   … “The Federal Criminal Code is 
replete with provisions that criminalize overlapping conduct,” and so “[t]he mere 
fact that two federal criminal statutes criminalize similar conduct says little about 
the scope of either.” … Congress was certainly authorized to enact a broader 
securities fraud provision, and it is not the place of courts to check that decision 
on policy grounds. 
Accordingly, we hold that the personal-benefit test does not apply to the 
wire fraud and Title 18 securities fraud statutes, and thus the district court did not 
err by refusing to instruct the jury on the  personal benefit test for those offenses. 
…. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION 
In upholding the jury’s verdict, we pause to reject Defendants’ thematic 
claim that the government’s positions, if accepted, would herald an unprecedented 
expansion of federal criminal law.  It is Defendants who ask us to break new 
ground by rejecting well-recognized theories of property rights and by adding, in 
effect, a “personal benefit” element to the Title 18 fraud statutes.  We decline 
these requests, holding instead that (1) a government agency’s confidential 
information relating to its contemplated rules may constitute “property” for 
purposes of the wire fraud and Title 18 securities fraud statutes, and (2) Dirks’s 
“personal-benefit” framework does not apply to these Title 18 fraud statutes.  Our 
remaining holdings confirm that Defendants’ misappropriation of CMS’s 
predecisional information, as proven at trial, fall comfortably within the Title 18 
securities fraud, wire fraud, conversion, and conspiracy statutes.  To the extent 
that the government’s decision to prosecute any or all of these crimes in this case 
raises broader enforcement policy concerns, that is a matter for Congress and the 
Executive, not the Judiciary.  Our inquiry is a more limited one, and having now 
completed it, we AFFIRM the judgments of the district court. 
  




State Securities (“Blue Sky”) Litigation 
§ 9.02 SLUSA Preemption of State Law 
 On page 509, add: 
CYAN, INC. v. BEAVER COUNTY EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT FUND 
United States Supreme Court 
____ U.S. ____, 138 S. Ct. 1061, 200 L. Ed. 2d 332 (2018) 
Justice KAGAN delivered the opinion of the [unanimous] Court. 
This case presents two questions about the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act 
of 1998 (SLUSA). . . .  First, did SLUSA strip state courts of jurisdiction over class actions 
alleging violations of only the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act)?  And second, even if not, did 
SLUSA empower defendants to remove such actions from state to federal court?  We answer 
both questions no. 
I 
A 
In the wake of the 1929 stock market crash, Congress enacted two laws, in successive 
years, to promote honest practices in the securities markets.  The 1933 Act required companies 
offering securities to the public to make “full and fair disclosure” of relevant information.  And 
to aid enforcement of those obligations, the statute created private rights of action.  Congress 
authorized both federal and state courts to exercise jurisdiction over those private suits. . . .  
More unusually, Congress also barred the removal of such actions from state to federal court. . . .  
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So if a plaintiff chose to bring a 1933 Act suit in state court, the defendant could not change the 
forum. 
Congress’s next foray. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act) operated 
differently.  That statute regulated not the original issuance of securities but instead all their 
subsequent trading, most commonly on national stock exchanges.  The 1934 Act, this Court held, 
could also be enforced through private rights of action.  But Congress determined that all those 
suits should fall within the “exclusive jurisdiction” of the federal courts.  So a plaintiff could 
never go to state court to litigate a 1934 Act claim. 
In 1995, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (Reform Act) amended both the 
1933 and the 1934 statutes in mostly identical ways.  Congress passed the Reform Act 
principally to stem “perceived abuses of the class-action vehicle in litigation involving nationally 
traded securities.” . . .  Some of the Reform Act’s provisions made substantive changes to the 
1933 and 1934 laws, and applied even when a 1933 Act suit was brought in state court.  For 
instance, the statute created a “safe harbor” from federal liability for certain “forward-looking 
statements” made by company officials. . . .  Other Reform Act provisions modified the 
procedures used in litigating securities actions, and applied only when such a suit was brought in 
federal court.  To take one example, the statute required a lead plaintiff in any class action 
brought under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to file a sworn certification stating, among 
other things, that he had not purchased the relevant securities “at the direction of plaintiff’s 
counsel.” . . . 
But the Reform Act fell prey to the law of “unintended consequence[s].” . . .  As this 
Court previously described the problem:  “Rather than face the obstacles set in their path by the 
Reform Act, plaintiffs and their representatives began bringing class actions under state law.” . . .  
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That “phenomenon was a novel one”—and an unwelcome one as well. . . .  To prevent plaintiffs 
from circumventing the Reform Act, Congress again undertook to modify both securities laws. 
The result was SLUSA, whose amendments to the 1933 Act are at issue in this case.  
Those amendments include, as relevant here, two operative provisions, two associated 
definitions, and two “conforming amendments” to the 1933 law’s jurisdictional section. . . .  The 
added material—now found in §§ 77p and 77v(a) and set out in full in this opinion’s appendix—
goes as follows. 
First, § 77p(b) altogether prohibits certain securities class actions based on state law.  
That provision—which we sometimes (and somewhat prosaically) refer to as the state-law class-
action bar—reads: 
“No covered class action based upon the statutory or common law of any State . . . 
may be maintained in any State or Federal court by any private party alleging— 
“(1) an untrue statement or omission of a material fact in connection with the purchase or 
sale of a covered security; or 
“(2) that the defendant used or employed any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.” 
According to SLUSA’s definitions, the term “covered class action” means a class action in 
which “damages are sought on behalf of more than 50 persons.” . . .  And the term “covered 
security” refers to a security listed on a national stock exchange. . . .  So taken all in all, § 77p(b) 
completely disallows (in both state and federal courts) sizable class actions that are founded on 
state law and allege dishonest practices respecting a nationally traded security’s purchase or sale. 
Next, § 77p(c) provides for the removal of certain class actions to federal court, as well as 
for their subsequent disposition: 
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“Any covered class action brought in any State court involving a covered security, 
as set forth in subsection (b) of this section, shall be removable to the Federal district 
court for the district in which the action is pending, and shall be subject to subsection (b) 
of this section.” 
The first chunk of that provision identifies the removable cases, partly by way of a cross-
reference (“as set forth in subsection (b)”) to the just-described class-action bar.  The final clause 
of the provision (“and shall be subject to subsection (b)”) indicates what should happen to a 
barred class suit after it has been removed:  The “proper course is to dismiss” the action. . . . As 
this Court has explained, § 77p(c) “avails a defendant of a federal forum in contemplation not of 
further litigation over the merits of a claim brought in state court, but of termination of the 
proceedings altogether.” . . . The point of providing that option, everyone here agrees, was to 
ensure the dismissal of a prohibited state-law class action even when a state court “would not 
adequately enforce” § 77p(b)’s bar. . . . 
Finally, the 1933 Act’s jurisdictional provision, codified at § 77v(a), now includes two 
new phrases framed as exemptions—SLUSA’s self-described “conforming amendments.”  The 
less significant of the pair, for our purposes, reflects the allowance for removing certain class 
actions described above.  Against the backdrop of the 1933 Act’s general removal bar that added 
(italicized) material reads: 
“Except as provided in section 77p(c) of this title, no case arising under this subchapter 
and brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of 
the United States.” 
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The more important of the conforming amendments in this case expresses a caveat to the general 
rule . . . that state and federal courts have concurrent jurisdiction over all claims to enforce the 
1933 Act.  As amended (again, with the new material in italics), the relevant sentence now reads: 
“The district courts of the United States . . . shall have jurisdiction[,] concurrent with State 
and Territorial courts, except as provided in section 77p of this title with respect to covered 
class actions, of all suits in equity and actions at law bought to enforce any liability or duty 
created by this subchapter.” 
Throughout this opinion, we refer to the italicized words just above as the “except clause.”  Its 
meaning is at the heart of the parties’ dispute in this Court. 
B 
The petitioners in this case are Cyan, a telecommunications company, and its officers and 
directors (together, Cyan).  The respondents are three pension funds and an individual (together, 
Investors) who purchased shares of Cyan stock in an initial public offering.  After the stock 
declined in value, the Investors brought a damages class action against Cyan in California 
Superior Court.  Their complaint alleges that Cyan’s offering documents contained material 
misstatements, in violation of the 1933 Act.  It does not assert any claims based on state law. 
Cyan moved to dismiss the Investors’ suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  It 
argued that what we have termed SLUSA’s “except clause”—i.e., the amendment made to § 
77v(a)’s concurrent-jurisdiction grant—stripped state courts of power to adjudicate 1933 Act 
claims in “covered class actions.”  The Investors did not dispute that their suit qualifies as such 
an action under SLUSA’s definition, see § 77p(f)(2).  But they maintained that SLUSA left intact 
state courts’ jurisdiction over all suits—including “covered class actions”—alleging only 1933 
Copyright © 2020 Carolina Academic Press, LLC. All rights reserved.
-52- 
 
Act claims.  The California Superior Court agreed with the Investors and denied Cyan’s motion 
to dismiss.  The state appellate courts then denied review of that ruling. . . . 
We granted Cyan’s petition for certiorari to resolve a split among state and federal courts 
about whether SLUSA deprived state courts of jurisdiction over “covered class actions” asserting 
only 1933 Act claims. 
In opposing Cyan’s jurisdictional position here, the Federal Government as amicus curiae 
raised another question:  whether SLUSA enabled defendants to remove 1933 Act class actions 
from state to federal court for adjudication.  That question is not directly presented because Cyan 
never attempted to remove the Investors’ suit.  But the removal issue is related to the parties’ 
jurisdictional arguments, and both Cyan and the Investors addressed it in briefing and argument. 
. . .  Accordingly, we consider as well the scope of § 77p(c)’s removal authorization. 
II 
By its terms, § 77v(a)’s “except clause” does nothing to deprive state courts of their 
jurisdiction to decide class actions brought under the 1933 Act.  And Cyan’s various appeals to 
SLUSA’s purposes and legislative history fail to overcome the clear statutory language.  The 
statute says what it says—or perhaps better put here, does not say what it does not say.  State-
court jurisdiction over 1933 Act claims thus continues undisturbed. 
A 
SLUSA’s text, read most straightforwardly, leaves in place state courts’ jurisdiction over 
1933 Act claims, including when brought in class actions.  Recall  that  the  background  rule of 
§ 77v(a)—in place since the 1933 Act’s passage—gives state courts concurrent jurisdiction over 
all suits “brought to enforce any liability or duty created by” that statute.  The except clause—
once again, “except as provided in section 77p of this title with respect to covered class 
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actions”—is drafted as a limitation on that rule:  It ensures that in any case in which § 77v(a) and 
§ 77p come into conflict, § 77p will control.  The critical question for this case is therefore 
whether § 77p limits state-court jurisdiction over class actions brought under the 1933 Act.  It 
does not.  As earlier described, § 77p bars certain securities class actions based on state law.  
And as a corollary of that prohibition, it authorizes removal of those suits so that a federal court 
can dismiss them.  But the section says nothing, and so does nothing, to deprive state courts of 
jurisdiction over class actions based on federal law.  That means the background rule of § 
77v(a)—under which a state court may hear the Investors’ 1933 Act suit—continues to govern. 
. . . . 
. . . When Congress passed SLUSA, state courts had for 65 years adjudicated all manner 
of 1933 Act cases, including class actions.  Indeed, defendants could not even remove those 
cases to federal court, as schemes of concurrent jurisdiction almost always allow. . . .  State 
courts thus had as much or more power over the 1933 Act’s enforcement as over any federal 
statute’s.  To think Cyan right, we would have to believe that Congress upended that entrenched 
practice not by any direct means, but instead by way of a conforming amendment to § 77v(a) 
(linked, in its view, with only a definition).  But Congress does not make “radical—but entirely 
implicit—change[s]” through “technical and conforming amendments.” . . .  Or to use the more 
general (and snappier) formulation of that rule, relevant to all “ancillary provisions,” Congress 
does not “hide elephants in mouseholes.” . . . That is yet one more reason to reject Cyan’s view 
of SLUSA’s text. 
B 
Faced with such recalcitrant statutory language, Cyan stakes much of its case on 
legislative purpose and history. . . .   Its claims come in two forms—one relating to the goals of 
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SLUSA as a whole and the other relating to the aims of the except clause.  Even assuming clear 
text can ever give way to purpose, Cyan would need some monster arguments on this score to 
create doubts about SLUSA’s meaning.  The points Cyan raises come nowhere close to that 
level. 
. . . . 
1 
. . . . 
. . . SLUSA ensured that federal courts would play the principal role in adjudicating 
securities class actions by means of its revisions to the 1934 Act.  As explained earlier, SLUSA 
amended that statute in the same main way it did the 1933 Act—by adding a state-law class-
action bar.  But there, the change had a double effect:  Because federal courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction over 1934 Act claims, forcing plaintiffs to bring class actions under the 1934 statute 
instead of state law also forced them to file in federal court.  That meant the bulk of securities 
class actions would proceed in federal court—because the 1934 Act regulates all trading of 
securities whereas the 1933 Act addresses only securities offerings. . . .  So even without Cyan’s 
contrived reading of the except clause, SLUSA largely accomplished the purpose articulated in 
its Conference Report:  moving securities class actions to federal court. 
To be sure, “largely” does not mean “entirely”—but then again, we do not generally 
expect statutes to fulfill 100% of all of their goals. . . .  Under our reading of SLUSA, all covered 
securities class actions must proceed under federal law; most (i.e., those alleging 1934 Act 
claims) must proceed in federal court; some (i.e., those alleging 1933 Act claims) may proceed in 
state court.  We do not know why Congress declined to require as well that 1933 Act class 
actions be brought in federal court; perhaps it was because of the long and unusually pronounced 
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tradition of according authority to state courts over 1933 Act litigation.  But in any event, we will 
not revise that legislative choice, by reading a conforming amendment and a definition in a most 
improbable way, in  an  effort  to  make  the world of securities litigation more consistent or 
pure. . . . 
2 
. . . . 
. . . [W]e doubt that the except clause was really necessary to address mixed class actions.  
Even without that clause, a competent state court faced with such  a  suit  would understand that 
§ 77p requires dismissal of the state-law claims—and that § 77v(a)’s jurisdictional grant over 
1933 Act suits is not to the contrary.  But on the other hand . . ., Congress may have thought that 
class-action lawyers would still try to circumvent SLUSA by tacking a 1933 Act claim onto a 
forbidden state-law class action, on the off chance of finding an error-prone judge.  (After all, the 
worst that could happen was that the court would throw out the state-law claims, leaving the 
plaintiff with a permissible 1933 Act suit.)  To prevent such gamesmanship—to make clear 
beyond peradventure that courts could not entertain the state-law half of mixed class actions—
Congress might have added the except clause. 
But even if Congress never specifically considered mixed suits, it could well have added 
the except clause in a more general excess of caution—to safeguard § 77p’s class-action bar 
come whatever might.  This Court has encountered many examples of Congress legislating in 
that hyper-vigilant way, to “remov[e] any doubt” as to things not particularly doubtful in the first 
instance. . . . Heedful of that history of machinations, Congress may have determined to 
eliminate any risk—even if unlikely or at the time unknown—that a pre-existing grant of power 
to state courts could be used to obstruct SLUSA’s new limitation on what they could decide.  
Copyright © 2020 Carolina Academic Press, LLC. All rights reserved.
-56- 
 
And so (this alternative explanation goes) Congress enacted the except clause—which, in 
insisting that the limitation prevailed, would function as the ultimate (though with any luck, 
unneeded) fail-safe device. 
But the most important response to this purposive argument echoes what we have said 
before about the weaknesses of Cyan’s own construction of the except clause.  In the end, the 
uncertainty surrounding Congress’s reasons for drafting that clause does not matter.  Nor does 
the possibility that the risk Congress addressed (whether specific or inchoate) did not exist.  
Because irrespective of those points, we have no sound basis for giving the except clause a 
broader reading than its language can bear.  And that is especially true in light of the dramatic 
change such an interpretation would work in the 1933 Act’s jurisdictional framework.  Whatever 
questions remain as to the except clause’s precise purpose—and we do not gainsay there are 
some—they do not give us permission to devise a statute (and at that, a transformative one) of 
our own. 
III 
Our last task is to address the Federal Government’s proposed halfway-house position.  
The Government rejects Cyan’s view that SLUSA stripped state courts of jurisdiction over 1933 
Act class actions, for roughly the same reasons we have given.  But like Cyan, the Government 
believes that “Congress would not have been content to leave” such suits “stuck in state court,” 
where the Reform Act’s procedural protections do not apply. . . .  So the Government offers a 
reading of SLUSA—in particular, of § 77p(c)—that would allow defendants to remove 1933 Act 
class actions to federal court, as long as they allege the kinds of misconduct listed in § 77p(b) 
(e.g., false statements or deceptive devices in connection with a covered security’s purchase or 
sale). 
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But most naturally read, § 77p(c)—SLUSA’s exception to the 1933 Act’s general bar on 
removal—refutes, not supports, the Government’s view.  Once again, § 77p(c) reads as follows: 
“Any covered class action brought in any State court involving a covered security, as set 
forth in subsection (b) of this section, shall be removable to the Federal district court for 
the district in which the action is pending, and shall be subject to subsection (b) of this 
section.” 
In other words, the covered class actions described in § 77p(b) can be removed to federal court 
(and, once there, shall be subject to dismissal . . .).   . . . [W]hich are the covered class actions 
described in § 77p(b)?  By this point, no one should have to be reminded:  They are state-law 
class actions alleging securities misconduct.  See § 77p(b) (prohibiting “class action[s] based 
upon the statutory or common law of any State”).  So those state-law suits are removable.  But 
conversely, federal-law suits like this one—alleging only 1933 Act claims—are not “class 
action[s] . . . as set forth in subsection (b).”  So they remain subject to the 1933 Act’s removal 
ban. 
. . . . 
At bottom, the Government makes the same mistake as Cyan:  It distorts SLUSA’s text 
because it thinks Congress simply must have wanted 1933 Act class actions to be litigated in 
federal court.  But this Court has no license to “disregard clear language” based on an intuition 
that “Congress must have intended something broader.” . . .  If further steps are needed, they are 
up to Congress. 




SLUSA did nothing to strip state courts of their longstanding jurisdiction to adjudicate 
class actions alleging only 1933 Act violations.  Neither did SLUSA authorize removing such 
suits from state to federal court.  We accordingly affirm the judgment below. 
It is so ordered. 
____________________ 
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Cyan, plaintiffs increasingly are bringing their 
Section 11 and other Securities Act claims in state courts.  In reaction thereto, a number of 
corporations adopted charter provisions mandating that stockholders file these Securities Act 
claims exclusively in federal court.  In Salzberg v. Sciabacucchi, 227 A.3d 102 (Del. 2020), the 
Delaware Supreme Court upheld the validity of such charter provisions.  An excerpt of the 
opinion follows. 
FFPs [Federal forum provisions] can provide a corporation with certain 
efficiencies in managing the procedural aspects of securities litigation following 
the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Cyan, Inc. v. Beaver County 
Employees Retirement Fund.  There, the United States Supreme Court 
unanimously held that federal and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction over 
class actions based on claims brought under the 1933 Act, and that such claims 
are not removable to federal court.  Following Cyan, in 2018, the filing of 1933 
Act cases in state courts escalated.  The 2018 Year in Review Report by 
Cornerstone Research found that, “[t]here were 55 percent more state-only filings 
than federal-only filings in 2018.”  Claims brought under Section 11 of the 1933 
Act “decreased in federal courts as a portion of filing activity moved to state 
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courts.”  The 2018 report observed that, “[t]he uptick in state actions following 
the Cyan decision indicates a change in approach by plaintiffs.” 
The recently released Cornerstone 2019 Year in Review Report states that, 
“[t]he number of state 1933 Act filings in 2019 increased by 40 percent from 
2018,” and that “[a]bout 45 percent of all state 1933 Act filings in 2019 had a 
parallel action in federal court.”  In 2019, the combined number of federal Section 
11 filings and state 1933 Act filings was 65, approximately a 59 percent overall 
increase from 2018.  Of the 65 filings, 22 were parallel filings, 27 were state-only 
filings (a 69 percent increase from 2018), and 16 were federal-only filings.  State-
only and parallel filings made up over 75 percent of all federal Section 11 and 
state 1933 Act filings in 2019.  Since Cyan, 43 parallel class actions have been 
filed in multiple jurisdictions.  The 2019 report observes that, “[t]he 65 filings in 
2019 was historically unprecedented,” and that, “[p]rior to 2015, there were only 
a handful of state court filings, and the highest number of federal Section 11 
filings previously was 57 in 1998.” 
When parallel state and federal actions are filed, no procedural mechanism 
is available to consolidate or coordinate multiple suits in state and federal court.  
The costs and inefficiencies of multiple cases being litigated simultaneously in 
both state and federal courts are obvious.  The possibility of inconsistent 
judgments and rulings on other matters, such as stays of discovery, also exists.  
By directing 1933 Act claims to federal courts when coordination and 
consolidation are possible, FFPs classically fit the definition of a provision “for 
the management of the business and for the conduct of the affairs of the 
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corporation.”  An FFP would also be a provision “defining, limiting and 
regulating the powers of the corporation, the directors and the stockholders,” 
since FFPs prescribe where current and former stockholders can bring Section 11 









Securities Class Action Practice and Procedure 
§ 11.08  Class Action Tolling 
   On page 602, add: 
CHINA AGRITECH, INC. v. RESH 
United States Supreme Court 
___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 1800, 201 L. Ed. 2d 123 
Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case concerns the tolling rule first stated in American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 
414 U.S. 538 (1974).  The Court held in American Pipe that the timely filing of a class action 
tolls the applicable statute of limitations for all persons encompassed by the class complaint.  
Where class-action status has been denied, the Court further ruled, members of the failed class 
could timely intervene as individual plaintiffs in the still-pending action, shorn of its class 
character.  Later, in Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345 (1983), the Court clarified 
American Pipe’s tolling rule:   The rule is not dependent on intervening in or joining an existing 
suit; it applies as well to putative class members who, after denial of class certification, “prefer to 
bring an individual suit rather than intervene . . . once the economies of a class action [are] no 
longer available.” . . . 
The question presented in the case now before us:  Upon denial of class certification, may 
a putative class member, in lieu of promptly joining an existing suit or promptly filing an 
individual action, commence a class action anew beyond the time allowed by the applicable 
statute of limitations?  Our answer is no.  American Pipe tolls the statute of limitations during the 
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pendency of a putative class action, allowing unnamed class members to join the action 
individually or file individual claims if the class fails.  But American Pipe does not permit the 
maintenance of a follow-on class action past expiration of the statute of limitations. 
I 
The instant suit is the third class action brought on behalf of purchasers of petitioner 
China Agritech’s common stock, alleging violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.  In 
short, the successive complaints each make materially identical allegations that China Agritech 
engaged in fraud and misleading business practices, causing the company’s stock price to 
plummet when several reports brought the misconduct to light.  The Exchange Act has a two-
year statute of limitations that begins to run upon discovery of the facts constituting the violation. 
28 U.S.C. § 1658(b).  The Act also has a five-year statute of repose.  The parties agree that the 
accrual date for purposes of the two-year limitation period is February 3, 2011, and for the five-
year repose period, November 12, 2009. 
Theodore Dean, a China Agritech shareholder, filed the first class-action complaint on 
February 11, 2011, at the start of the two-year limitation period.  As required by the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), Dean’s counsel posted notice of the action in 
two “widely circulated national business-oriented publication[s],” and invited any member of the 
purported class to move to serve as lead plaintiff.  Six shareholders responded to the notice, 
seeking to be named lead plaintiffs; other shareholders who had filed their own class complaints 
dismissed them in view of the Dean action.  On May 3, 2012, after several months of discovery 
and deferral of a lead-plaintiff ruling, the District Court denied class certification.  The plaintiffs, 
the District Court determined, had failed to establish that China Agritech stock traded on an 
efficient market—a necessity for proving reliance on a classwide basis.  Dean’s counsel then 
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published a notice informing shareholders of the certification denial and advising:  “You must 
act yourself to protect your rights.  You may protect your rights by joining in the current Action 
as a plaintiff or by filing your own action against China Agritech.”  The Dean action settled in 
September 2012, occasioning dismissal of the suit.  See 857 F.3d 994, 998 (C.A.9 2017). 
On October 4, 2012—within the two-year statute of limitations—Dean’s counsel filed a 
new complaint (Smyth) with a new set of plaintiffs and new efficient-market evidence.  Eight 
shareholders responded to the PSLRA notice, seeking lead-plaintiff appointment.  The District 
Court again denied class certification, this time on typicality and adequacy grounds.  Thereafter, 
the Smyth plaintiffs settled their individual claims with the defendants and voluntarily dismissed 
their suit.  Because the Smyth litigation was timely commenced, putative class members who 
promptly initiated individual suits in the wake of the class-action denial would have encountered 
no statute of limitations bar. 
Respondent Michael Resh, who had not sought lead-plaintiff status in either the Dean or 
Smyth proceedings and was represented by counsel who had not appeared in the earlier actions, 
filed the present suit on June 30, 2014, styling it a class action—a year and a half after the statute 
of limitations expired.  The other respondents moved to intervene, seeking designation as lead 
plaintiffs; together with Resh, they filed an amended complaint.  The District Court dismissed 
the class complaint as untimely, holding that the Dean and Smyth actions did not toll the time to 
initiate class claims. 
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed:  “[P]ermitting future class action 
named plaintiffs, who were unnamed class members in previously uncertified classes, to avail 
themselves of American Pipe tolling,” the court reasoned, “would advance the policy objectives 
that led the Supreme Court to permit tolling in the first place.”  857 F.3d, at 1004.  Applying 
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American Pipe tolling to successive class actions, the Ninth Circuit added, would cause no unfair 
surprise to defendants and would promote economy of litigation by reducing incentives for filing 
protective class suits during the pendency of an initial certification motion. 
We granted certiorari, in view of a division of authority among the Courts of Appeals 
over whether otherwise-untimely successive class claims may be salvaged by American Pipe 
tolling. . . . 
II 
A 
American Pipe established that “the commencement of the original class suit tolls the 
running of the statute [of limitations] for all purported members of the class who make timely 
motions to intervene after the court has found the suit inappropriate for class action status.”  “A 
contrary rule,” the Court reasoned in American Pipe, “would deprive [Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure] 23 class actions of the efficiency and economy of litigation which is a principal purpose 
of the procedure.”  This is so, the Court explained, because without tolling, “[p]otential class 
members would be induced to file protective motions to intervene or to join in the event that a 
class was later found unsuitable.”  In Crown, Cork, the Court further elaborated:  Failure to extend 
the American Pipe rule “to class members filing separate actions,” in addition to those who move 
to intervene, would result in “a needless multiplicity of actions” filed by class members preserving 
their individual claims—“precisely the situation that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and the 
tolling rule of American Pipe were designed to avoid.” . . . 
American Pipe and Crown, Cork addressed only putative class members who wish to sue 
individually after a class certification denial. . . . 
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What about a putative class representative, like Resh, who brings his claims as a new class 
action after the statute of limitations has expired?  Neither decision so much as hints that tolling 
extends to otherwise time-barred class claims.  We hold that American Pipe does not permit a 
plaintiff who waits out the statute of limitations to piggyback on an earlier, timely filed class action.  
The “efficiency and economy of litigation” that support tolling of individual claims do not support 
maintenance of untimely successive class actions; any additional class filings should be made early 
on, soon after the commencement of the first action seeking class certification. 
American Pipe tolls the limitation period for individual claims because economy of 
litigation favors delaying those claims until after a class-certification denial.  If certification is 
granted, the claims will proceed as a class and there would be no need for the assertion of any 
claim individually.  If certification is denied, only then would it be necessary to pursue claims 
individually. 
With class claims, on the other hand, efficiency favors early assertion of competing class 
representative claims.  If class treatment is appropriate, and all would-be representatives have 
come forward, the district court can select the best plaintiff with knowledge of the full array of 
potential class representatives and class counsel.  And if the class mechanism is not a viable option 
for the claims, the decision denying certification will be made at the outset of the case, litigated 
once for all would-be class representatives. 
Rule 23 evinces a preference for preclusion of untimely successive class actions by 
instructing that class certification should be resolved early on. . . . 
The PSLRA, which governs this litigation, evinces a similar preference, this time embodied 
in legislation, for grouping class-representative filings at the outset of litigation.  When the Dean 
and Smyth timely commenced actions were first filed, counsel put any shareholder who might wish 
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to serve as lead plaintiff on notice of the action.  Several heeded the call—six in Dean and eight 
in Smyth.  The PSLRA, by requiring notice of the commencement of a class action, aims to draw 
all potential lead plaintiffs into the suit so that the district court will have the full roster of 
contenders before deciding which contender to appoint. . . .  With notice and the opportunity to 
participate in the first (and second) round of class litigation, there is little reason to allow plaintiffs 
who passed up those opportunities to enter the fray several years after class proceedings first 
commenced. 
Ordinarily, to benefit from equitable tolling, plaintiffs must demonstrate that they have 
been diligent in pursuit of their claims. . . .  Even American Pipe, which did not analyze “criteria 
of the formal doctrine of equitable tolling in any direct manner,” observed that tolling was 
permissible in the circumstances because plaintiffs who later intervened to pursue individual 
claims had not slept on their rights. . . . Those plaintiffs reasonably relied on the class 
representative, who sued timely, to protect their interests in their individual claims.  A would-be 
class representative who commences suit after expiration of the limitation period, however, can 
hardly qualify as diligent in asserting claims and pursuing relief.  Her interest in representing the 
class as lead plaintiff, therefore, would not be preserved by the prior plaintiff’s timely filed class 
suit. 
Respondents’ proposed reading would allow the statute of limitations to be extended time 
and again; as each class is denied certification, a new named plaintiff could file a class complaint 
that resuscitates the litigation. . . .  This prospect points up a further distinction between the 
individual-claim tolling established by American Pipe and tolling for successive class actions.  The 
time to file individual actions once a class action ends is finite, extended only by the time the class 
suit was pending; the time for filing successive class suits, if tolling were allowed, could be 
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limitless.  Respondents’ claims happen to be governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1658(b)(2)’s five-year 
statute of repose, so the time to file complaints has a finite end.  Statutes of repose, however, are 
not ubiquitous. . . .  Most statutory schemes provide for a single limitation period without any outer 
limit to safeguard against serial relitigation.  Endless tolling of a statute of limitations is not a result 
envisioned by American Pipe. 
B 
. . . . 
The watchwords of American Pipe are efficiency and economy of litigation, a principal 
purpose of Rule 23 as well.  Extending American Pipe tolling to successive class actions does 
not serve that purpose.  The contrary rule, allowing no tolling for out-of-time class actions, will 
propel putative class representatives to file suit well within the limitation period and seek 
certification promptly.  For all the above-stated reasons, it is the rule we adopt today:  Time to 
file a class action falls outside the bounds of American Pipe. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and 
the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, concurring in the judgment.   
I agree with the Court that in cases governed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995 (PSLRA), like this one, a plaintiff who seeks to bring a successive class action may 
not rely on the tolling rule established by American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah.  I cannot, 
however, join the majority in going further by holding that the same is true for class actions not 
subject to the PSLRA. 
. . . . 
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Although there is ample support for denying American Pipe tolling to successive class 
actions subject to the PSLRA, the majority’s reasoning does not justify denying American Pipe 
tolling to other successive class actions.  The majority could have avoided this error by limiting 
its decision to the issues presented by the facts of this case. 
Despite the Court’s misstep in adopting an unnecessarily broad rule, district courts can 
help mitigate the potential unfairness of denying American Pipe tolling to class claims not 
subject to the PSLRA.  Where appropriate, district courts should liberally permit amendment of 
the pleadings or intervention of new plaintiffs and counsel. 
Because I agree with the majority’s conclusion just as applied to class actions governed 
by the PSLRA, like this one, I concur only in the judgment. 
  




Enforcement of the Securities Laws 
§ 13.08  The Commission’s Enforcement Tools 
   [A] Injunctions 
   On page 707, add: 
KOKESH v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
United States Supreme Court 
____ U.S. ____, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 198 L. Ed. 2d 86 (2017) 
Justice SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
A 5-year statute of limitations applies to any “action, suit or proceeding for the 
enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise.”  28 U.S.C. § 2462.  
This case presents the question whether § 2462 applies to claims for disgorgement imposed as a 
sanction for violating a federal securities law.  The Court holds that it does.  Disgorgement in the 
securities-enforcement context is a “penalty” within the meaning of § 2462, and so disgorgement 
actions must be commenced within five years of the date the claim accrues. 
I 
A 
After rampant abuses in the securities industry led to the 1929 stock market crash and the 
Great Depression, Congress enacted a series of laws to ensure that “the highest ethical standards 
prevail in every facet of the securities industry.”  The second in the series—the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934—established the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or 
Commission) to enforce federal securities laws.  Congress granted the Commission power to 
prescribe “’rules and regulations . . . as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
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protection of investors.’”  In addition to rulemaking, Congress vested the Commission with 
“broad authority to conduct investigations into possible violations of the federal securities laws.”  
If an investigation uncovers evidence of wrongdoing, the Commission may initiate enforcement 
actions in federal district court. 
Initially, the only statutory remedy available to the SEC in an enforcement action was an 
injunction barring future violations of securities laws.  In the absence of statutory authorization 
for monetary remedies, the Commission urged courts to order disgorgement as an exercise of 
their “inherent equity power to grant relief ancillary to an injunction.”  Generally, disgorgement 
is a form of “[r]estitution measured by the defendant’s wrongful gain.”  Restatement (Third) of 
Restitution and Unjust Enrichment § 51, Comment a, p. 204 (2010) (Restatement (Third)).  
Disgorgement requires that the defendant give up “those gains . . . properly attributable to the 
defendant’s interference with the claimant’s legally protected rights.”  Beginning in the 1970’s, 
courts ordered disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceedings in order to “deprive . . . 
defendants of their profits in order to remove any monetary reward for violating” securities laws 
and to “protect the investing public by providing an effective deterrent to future violations.” . . . 
In 1990, as part of the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock Reform Act, 
Congress authorized the Commission to seek monetary civil penalties.  The Act left the 
Commission with a full panoply of enforcement tools:  It may promulgate rules, investigate 
violations of those rules and the securities laws generally, and seek monetary penalties and 
injunctive relief for those violations.  In the years since the Act, however, the Commission has 
continued its practice of seeking disgorgement in enforcement proceedings. 
This Court has already held that the 5-year statute of limitations set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 
2462 applies when the Commission seeks statutory monetary penalties.  See Gabelli v. SEC, 568 
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U.S. 442 (2013).  The question here is whether § 2462, which applies to any “action, suit or 
proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise,” 
also applies when the SEC seeks disgorgement. 
B 
Charles Kokesh owned two investment-adviser firms that provided investment advice to 
business-development companies.  In late 2009, the Commission commenced an enforcement 
action in Federal District Court alleging that between 1995 and 2009, Kokesh, through his firms, 
misappropriated $34.9 million from four of those development companies.  The Commission 
further alleged that, in order to conceal the misappropriation, Kokesh caused the filing of false 
and misleading SEC reports and proxy statements.  The Commission sought civil monetary 
penalties, disgorgement, and an injunction barring Kokesh from violating securities laws in the 
future. 
After a 5-day trial, a jury found that Kokesh’s actions violated the Investment Company 
Act of 1940, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. . . .  
The District Court then turned to the task of imposing penalties sought by the Commission.  As 
to the civil monetary penalties, the District Court determined that § 2462’s 5-year limitations 
period precluded any penalties for misappropriation occurring prior to October 27, 2004—that is, 
five years prior to the date the Commission filed the complaint.  The court ordered Kokesh to 
pay a civil penalty of $2,354,593, which represented “the amount of funds that [Kokesh] himself 
received during the limitations period.  Regarding the Commission’s request for a $34.9 million 
disgorgement judgment—$29.9 million of which resulted from violations outside the limitations 
period—the court agreed with the Commission that because disgorgement is not a “penalty” 
within the meaning of § 2462, no limitations period applied.  The court therefore entered a 
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disgorgement judgment in the amount of $34.9 million and ordered Kokesh to pay an additional 
$18.1 million in prejudgment interest. 
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed.  It agreed with the District Court 
that disgorgement is not a penalty, and further found that disgorgement is not a forfeiture.  The 
court thus concluded that the statute of limitations in § 2462 does not apply to SEC disgorgement 
claims. 
This Court granted certiorari, to resolve disagreement among the Circuits over whether 
disgorgement claims in SEC proceedings are subject to the 5-year limitations period of § 2462. 
Statutes of limitations “se[t] a fixed date when exposure to the specified Government 
enforcement efforts en[d].”  Such limits are “‘vital to the welfare of society’” and rest on the 
principle that “‘even wrongdoers are entitled to assume that their sins may be forgotten.’”  The 
statute of limitations at issue here—28 U.S.C. § 2462—finds its roots in a law enacted nearly 
two centuries ago.  In its current form, § 2462 establishes a 5-year limitations period for “an 
action, suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture.”  This 
limitations period applies here if SEC disgorgement qualifies as either a fine, penalty, or 
forfeiture.  We hold that SEC disgorgement constitutes a penalty.   
[Nothing in this opinion should be interpreted as an opinion on whether courts possess 
authority to order disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceedings or on whether courts have 
properly applied disgorgement principles in this context.  The sole question presented in this case 
is whether disgorgement, as applied in SEC enforcement actions, is subject to § 2462’s 
limitations period. [Footnote moved to text — editor.]] 
A “penalty” is a “punishment, whether corporal or pecuniary, imposed and enforced by 
the State, for a crime or offen[s]e against its laws.”  This definition gives rise to two principles.  
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First, whether a sanction represents a penalty turns in part on “whether the wrong sought to be 
redressed is a wrong to the public, or a wrong to the individual.”  Although statutes creating 
private causes of action against wrongdoers may appear — or even be labeled — penal, in many 
cases “neither the liability imposed nor the remedy given is strictly penal.”  This is because 
“[p]enal laws, strictly and properly, are those imposing punishment for an offense committed 
against the State.”  Second, a pecuniary sanction operates as a penalty only if it is sought “for the 
purpose of punishment, and to deter others from offending in like manner”—as opposed to 
compensating a victim for his loss. 
The Court has applied these principles in construing the term “penalty.”  In Brady v. Daly, 
175 U.S. 148 (1899), for example, a playwright sued a defendant in Federal Circuit Court under a 
statute providing that copyright infringers “‘shall be liable for damages . . . not less than one 
hundred dollars for the first [act of infringement], and fifty dollars for every subsequent 
performance, as to the court shall appear to be just.’”  The defendant argued that the Circuit Court 
lacked jurisdiction on the ground that a separate statute vested district courts with exclusive 
jurisdiction over actions “to recover a penalty.”  To determine whether the statutory damages 
represented a penalty, this Court noted first that the statute provided “for a recovery of damages 
for an act which violates the rights of the plaintiff, and gives the right of action solely to him” 
rather than the public generally, and second, that “the whole recovery is given to the proprietor, 
and the statute does not provide for a recovery by any other person.”  By providing a 
compensatory remedy for a private wrong, the Court held the statute did not impose a “penalty.” 
Similarly, in construing the statutory ancestor of § 2462, the Court utilized the same 
principles.  In Meeker v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 236 U.S. 412 (1915), the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, a now-defunct federal agency charged with regulating railroads, ordered a railroad 
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company to refund and pay damages to a shipping company for excessive shipping rates.  The 
railroad company argued that the action was barred by Rev. Stat. § 1047, Comp. Stat. 1913, § 
1712 (now 28 U.S.C. § 2462), which imposed a 5-year limitations period upon any “‘suit or 
prosecution for a penalty or forfeiture, pecuniary or otherwise, accruing under the laws of the 
United States.’”  The Court rejected that argument, reasoning that “the words ‘penalty or 
forfeiture’ in [the statute] refer to something imposed in a punitive way for an infraction of a 
public law.”  A penalty, the Court held, does “not include a liability imposed [solely] for the 
purpose of redressing a private injury.”  Because the liability imposed was compensatory and paid 
entirely to a private plaintiff, it was not a “penalty” within the meaning of the statute of 
limitations.  See also Gabelli, 568 U.S., at 451-452 (“[P]enalties” in the context of § 2462 “go 
beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and label defendants wrongdoers”). 
B 
Application of the foregoing principles readily demonstrates that SEC disgorgement 
constitutes a penalty within the meaning of § 2462. 
First, SEC disgorgement is imposed by the courts as a consequence for violating what we 
described in Meeker as public laws.  The violation for which the remedy is sought is committed 
against the United States rather than an aggrieved individual—this is why, for example, a 
securities-enforcement action may proceed even if victims do not support or are not parties to the 
prosecution.  As the Government concedes, “[w]hen the SEC seeks disgorgement, it acts in the 
public interest, to remedy harm to the public at large, rather than standing in the shoes of 
particular injured parties.”  Brief for United States 22.  Courts agree.  See, e.g., SEC v. Rind, 991 
F.2d 1486, 1491 (C.A. 9 1993) (“[D]isgorgement actions further the Commission’s public policy 
mission of protecting investors and safeguarding the integrity of the markets”); SEC v. Teo, 746 
Copyright © 2020 Carolina Academic Press, LLC. All rights reserved.
-75- 
 
F.3d 90, 102 (C.A.3 2014) (“[T]he SEC pursues [disgorgement] ‘independent of the claims of 
individual investors’” in order to “‘promot[e] economic and social policies’”). 
Second, SEC disgorgement is imposed for punitive purposes.  In Texas Gulf—one of the 
first cases requiring disgorgement in SEC proceedings—the court emphasized the need “to 
deprive the defendants of their profits in order to . . . protect the investing public by providing an 
effective deterrent to future violations.”  312 F.Supp., at 92.  In the years since, it has become 
clear that deterrence is not simply an incidental effect of disgorgement. Rather, courts have 
consistently held that “[t]he primary purpose of disgorgement orders is to deter violations of the 
securities laws by depriving violators of their ill-gotten gains.”  Sanctions imposed for the 
purpose of deterring infractions of public laws are inherently punitive because “deterrence [is] 
not [a] legitimate nonpunitive governmental objectiv[e].”  Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539, n. 
20 (1979). 
Finally, in many cases, SEC disgorgement is not compensatory. As courts and the 
Government have employed the remedy, disgorged profits are paid to the district court, and it is 
“within the court’s discretion to determine how and to whom the money will be distributed.”  
Courts have required disgorgement “regardless of whether the disgorged funds will be paid to 
such investors as restitution.”  Some disgorged funds are paid to victims; other funds are 
dispersed to the United States Treasury.  See, e.g., Fishbach Corp., 133 F.3d at 171 (affirming 
distribution of disgorged funds to Treasury where “no party before the court was entitled to the 
funds and . . . the persons who might have equitable claims were too dispersed for feasible 
identification and payment”); SEC v. Lund, 570 F.Supp. 1397, 1404-1405 (C.D.Cal. 1983) 
(ordering disgorgement and directing trustee to disperse funds to victims if “feasible” and to 
disperse any remaining money to the Treasury).  Even though district courts may distribute the 
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funds to the victims, they have not identified any statutory command that they do so.  When an 
individual is made to pay a noncompensatory sanction to the Government as a consequence of a 
legal violation, the payment operates as a penalty. 
SEC disgorgement thus bears all the hallmarks of a penalty.  It is imposed as a 
consequence of violating a public law and it is intended to deter, not to compensate.  The 5-year 
statute of limitations in § 2462 therefore applies when the SEC seeks disgorgement. 
C 
The Government’s primary response to all of this is that SEC disgorgement is not 
punitive but “remedial” in that it “lessen[s] the effects of a violation” by “‘restor[ing] the status 
quo.’”  As an initial matter, it is not clear that disgorgement, as courts have applied it in the SEC 
enforcement context, simply returns the defendant to the place he would have occupied had he 
not broken the law.  SEC disgorgement sometimes exceeds the profits gained as a result of the 
violation.  Thus, for example, “an insider trader may be ordered to disgorge not only the 
unlawful gains that accrue to the wrongdoer directly, but also the benefit that accrues to third 
parties whose gains can be attributed to the wrongdoer’s conduct.”  Individuals who illegally 
provide confidential trading information have been forced to disgorge profits gained by 
individuals who received and traded based on that information—even though they never received 
any profits.  And, as demonstrated by this case, SEC disgorgement sometimes is ordered without 
consideration of a defendant’s expenses that reduced the amount of illegal profit.  App. To Pet. 
for Cert. 43a; see Restatement (Third) § 51, Comment h, at 216 (“As a general rule, the 
defendant is entitled to a deduction for all marginal costs incurred in producing the revenues that 
are subject to disgorgement.  Denial of an otherwise appropriate deduction, by making the 
defendant liable in excess of net gains, results in a punitive sanction that the law of restitution 
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normally attempts to avoid”).  In such cases, disgorgement does not simply restore the status 
quo; it leaves the defendant worse off.  The justification for this practice given by the court 
below demonstrates that disgorgement in this context is a punitive, rather than a remedial, 
sanction:  Disgorgement, that court explained, is intended not only to “prevent the wrongdoer’s 
unjust enrichment” but also “to deter others’ violations of the securities laws.”  True, 
disgorgement serves compensatory goals in some cases; however, we have emphasized “the fact 
that sanctions frequently serve more than one purpose.”  “‘A civil sanction that cannot fairly be 
said solely to serve a remedial purpose, but rather can only be explained as also serving either 
retributive or deterrent purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term.’”  
Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. at 621; cf.  Bajakajian, 524 U.S., at 331, n. 6 (“[A] modern 
statutory forfeiture is a ‘fine’ for Eighth Amendment purposes if it constitutes punishment even 
in part”).  Because disgorgement orders “go beyond compensation, are intended to punish, and 
label defendants wrongdoers” as a consequence of violating public laws, they represent a penalty 
and thus fall within the 5-year statute of limitations of § 2462. 
III 
Disgorgement, as it is applied in SEC enforcement proceedings, operates as a penalty 
under § 2462.  Accordingly, any claim for disgorgement in an SEC enforcement action must be 
commenced within five years of the date the claim accrued. 
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LIU v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
United States Supreme Court 
2020 WL 3405845 
JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR delivered the opinion of the Court. 
In Kokesh v. SEC, [137 S. Ct. 1635] (2017), this Court held that a disgorgement order in a 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) enforcement action imposes a “penalty” for the 
purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2462, the applicable statute of limitations.  In so deciding, the Court 
reserved an antecedent question:  whether, and to what extent, the SEC may seek “disgorgement” 
in the first instance through its power to award “equitable relief” under 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5), a 
power that historically excludes punitive sanctions.  The Court holds today that a disgorgement 
award that does not exceed a wrongdoer’s net profits and is awarded for victims is equitable 
relief permissible under § 78u(d)(5).  The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for the 
courts below to ensure the award was so limited. 
I 
A 
Congress authorized the SEC to enforce the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 … and to punish securities fraud through administrative and civil 
proceedings.  In administrative proceedings, the SEC can seek limited civil penalties and 
“disgorgement.” …  In civil actions, the SEC can seek civil penalties and “equitable relief.”  See, 
e.g., § 78u(d)(5) (“In any action or proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission under 
any provision of the securities laws, … any Federal court may grant … any equitable relief that 
may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors”); see also § 78u(d)(3) (“Money 
penalties in civil actions” ….). 
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Congress did not define what falls under the umbrella of “equitable relief.”  Thus, courts 
have had to consider which remedies the SEC may impose as part of its §78u(d)(5) powers. 
Starting with SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301 (CA2 1971), courts 
determined that the SEC had authority to obtain what it called “restitution,” and what in 
substance amounted to “profits” that “merely depriv[e]” a defendant of “the gains of … wrongful 
conduct.” … Over the years, the SEC has continued to request this remedy, later referred to as 
“disgorgement,” and courts have continued to award it…. 
In Kokesh, this Court determined that disgorgement constituted a “penalty” for the 
purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2462, which establishes a 5-year statute of limitations for “an action, 
suit or proceeding for the enforcement of any civil fine, penalty, or forfeiture.”  The Court 
reached this conclusion based on several considerations, namely, that disgorgement is imposed 
as a consequence of violating public laws, it is assessed in part for punitive purposes, and in 
many cases, the award is not compensatory.  But the Court did not address whether a § 2462 
penalty can nevertheless qualify as “equitable relief” under § 78u(d)(5), given that equity never 
“lends its aid to enforce a forfeiture or penalty.” …  The Court cautioned, moreover, that its 
decision should not be interpreted “as an opinion on whether courts possess authority to order 
disgorgement in SEC enforcement proceedings.”  This question is now squarely before the 
Court. 
B 
The SEC action and disgorgement award at issue here arise from a scheme to defraud 
foreign nationals.  Petitioners Charles Liu and his wife, Xin (Lisa) Wang, solicited nearly $27 
million from foreign investors under the EB-5 Immigrant Investor Program (EB-5 Program).  
The EB-5 Program, administered by the U.S. Citizenship and Immigrant Services, permits 
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noncitizens to apply for permanent residence in the United States by investing in approved 
commercial enterprises that are based on “proposals for promoting economic growth.” … 
Investments in EB-5 projects are subject to the federal securities laws. 
Liu sent a private offering memorandum to prospective investors, pledging that the bulk 
of any contributions would go toward the construction costs of a cancer-treatment center.  The 
memorandum specified that only amounts collected from a small administrative fee would fund 
“‘legal, accounting and administration expenses.’”  An SEC investigation revealed, however, 
that Liu spent nearly $20 million of investor money on ostensible marketing expenses and 
salaries, an amount far more than what the offering memorandum permitted and far in excess of 
the administrative fees collected….  The investigation also revealed that Liu diverted a sizable 
portion of those funds to personal accounts and to a company under Wang’s control.  Only a 
fraction of the funds were put toward a lease, property improvements, and a proton-therapy 
machine for cancer treatment. 
The SEC brought a civil action against petitioners, alleging that they violated the terms of 
the offering documents by misappropriating millions of dollars.  The District Court found for the 
SEC, granting an injunction barring petitioners form participating in the EB-5 Program and 
imposing a civil penalty at the highest tier authorized.  It also ordered disgorgement equal to the 
full amount petitioners had raised from investors, less the $234,899 that remained in the 
corporate accounts for the project…. 
Petitioners objected that the disgorgement award failed to account for their business 
expenses.  The District Court disagreed, concluding that the sum was a “reasonable 
approximation of the profits causally connected to [their] violation.”  The court ordered 
petitioners jointly and severally liable for the full amount that the SEC sought. 
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed.  It acknowledged that Kokesh “expressly refused to reach” 
the issue whether the District Court had the authority to order disgorgement.  754 Fed. Appx., at 
509.  The court relied on Circuit precedent to conclude that the “proper amount of disgorgement 
in a scheme such as this one is the entire amount raised less the money paid back to the 
investors.” … 
We granted certiorari to determine whether § 78u(d)(5) authorizes the SEC to seek 
disgorgement beyond a defendant’s net profits from wrongdoing. 
II 
Our task is a familiar one.  In interpreting statutes like § 78u(d)(5) that provide for 
“equitable relief,” this Court analyzes whether a particular remedy falls into “those categories of 
relief that were typically available in equity.” …  The “basic contours of the term are well 
known” and can be discerned by consulting works on equity jurisprudence…. 
These works on equity jurisprudence reveal two principles.  First, equity practice long 
authorized courts to strip wrongdoers of their ill-gotten gains, with scholars and courts using 
various labels for the remedy.  Second, to avoid transforming an equitable remedy into a punitive 
sanction, courts restricted the remedy to an individual wrongdoer’s net profits to be awarded for 
victims. 
A 
Equity courts have routinely deprived wrongdoers of their net profits from unlawful 
activity, even though that remedy may have gone by different names…. 
No matter the label, this “profit-based measure of unjust enrichment” … reflected a 
foundational principle:  “[I]t would be inequitable that [a wrongdoer] should make a profit out of 
his own wrong”….  At the same time courts recognized that the wrongdoer should not profit “by 
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his own wrong,” they also recognized the countervailing equitable principle that the wrongdoer 
should not be punished by “pay[ing] more than a fair compensation to the person wronged.”… 
Decisions from this Court confirm that a remedy tethered to a wrongdoer’s net unlawful 
profits, whatever the name, has been a mainstay of equity courts…. 
Subsequent cases confirm the “‘protean character’ of the profits-recovery remedy.”  In 
Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987), the Court described “disgorgement of improper 
profits” as “traditionally considered an equitable remedy.” …  While the court acknowledged  
that disgorgement was a “limited form of penalty” insofar as it takes money out of the 
wrongdoer’s hands, it nevertheless compared disgorgement to restitution that simply “‘restor[es] 
the status quo,’” thus situating the remedy squarely within the heartland of equity…. 
Contrary to petitioners’ argument, equity courts did not limit this remedy to cases 
involving a breach of trust or of fiduciary duty.  As petitioners acknowledge, courts authorized 
profits-based relief in patent-infringement actions where no such trust or special relationship 
existed…. 
… Thus, as these cases demonstrate, equity courts habitually awarded profits-based 
remedies in patent cases well before Congress explicitly authorized that form of relief. 
B 
While equity courts did not limit profits remedies to particular types of cases, they did 
circumscribe the award in multiple ways to avoid transforming it into a penalty outside their 
equitable powers. 
For one, the profits remedy often imposed a constructive trust on wrongful gains for 
wronged victims.  The remedy itself thus converted the wrongdoer, who in many cases was an 
infringer, “into a trustee, as to those profits, for the owner of the patent which he infringes.” … 
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Equity courts also generally awarded profits-based remedies against individuals or 
partners engaged in concerted wrongdoing, not against multiple wrongdoers under a joint-and-
several liability theory…. 
Finally, courts limited awards to the net profits from wrongdoing, that is, “the gain made 
upon any business or investment, when both the receipts and payments are taken into the 
account.” … 
The Court has carved out an exception when the “entire profit of a business or 
undertaking” results from the wrongful activity.  In such cases, the Court has explained, the 
defendant “will not be allowed to diminish the show of profits by putting in unconscionable 
claims for personal services or other inequitable deductions.” … 
Setting aside that circumstance, however, courts consistently restricted awards to net 
profits from wrongdoing after deducting legitimate expenses.  Such remedies, when assessed 
against only culpable actors and for victims, fall comfortably within “those categories of relief 
that were typically available in equity.” … 
C 
By incorporating these longstanding equitable principles into § 78u(d)(5), Congress 
prohibited the SEC from seeking an equitable remedy in excess of a defendant’s net profits from 
wrongdoing.  To be sure, the SEC originally endeavored to conform its disgorgement remedy to 
the common-law limitations in  § 78u(d)5).  Over the years, however, courts have occasionally 
awarded disgorgement in three main ways that test the bounds of equity practice:  by ordering 
the proceeds of fraud to be deposited in Treasury funds instead of disbursing them to victims, 
imposing joint-and-several disgorgement liability, and declining to deduct even legitimate 
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expenses from the receipts of fraud.2  The SEC’s disgorgement remedy in such incarnations is in 
considerable tension with equity practices. 
Petitioners go further.  They claim that this Court effectively decided in Kokesh that 
disgorgement is necessarily a penalty, and thus not the kind of relief available at equity.  Not so.  
Kokesh expressly declined to pass on the question. To be sure, the Kokesh Court evaluated a 
version of the SEC’s disgorgement remedy that seemed to exceed the bounds of traditional 
equitable principles.  But that decision has no bearing on the SEC’s ability to conform future 
requests for a defendant’s profits to the limits outlined in common-law cases awarding a 
wrongdoer’s net gains. 
The Government, for its part, contends that the SEC’s interpretation of the equitable 
disgorgement remedy has Congress’ tacit support, even if it exceeds the bounds of equity 
practice.  It points to the fact that Congress has enacted a number of other statutes referring to 
“disgorgement.” 
That argument attaches undue significance to Congress’ use of the term.  It is true that 
Congress has authorized the SEC to seek “disgorgement” in administrative actions….  But it 
makes sense that Congress would expressly name the equitable powers it grants to an agency for 
use in administrative proceedings.  After all, agencies are unlike federal courts where, “[u]nless 
otherwise provided by statute, all … inherent equitable powers … are available for the proper 
and complete exercise of that jurisdiction.”… 
 
2 See, e.g., SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 441, 454 (CA9 1990) (requiring defendant to disgorge the profits that his 
stockbroker made from unlawful trades); SEC v. Brown, 658 F.3d 858, 860-861 (CA8 2011) (per curiam) (ordering 
joint-and several disgorgement of funds collected from investors and concluding that “’the overwhelming weight of 
authority hold[s] that securities law violators may not offset their disgorgement liability with business expenses”); 
SEC v. Contorinis, 743 F.3d 296, 304-306 (CA2 2014) (requiring defendant to disgorge benefits conferred on close 
associates). 
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Congress does not enlarge the breadth of an equitable, profit-based remedy simply by 
using the term “disgorgement” in various statutes.  The Government argues that under the prior-
construction principle, Congress should be presumed to have been aware of the scope of 
“disgorgement” as interpreted by lower courts and as having incorporated the (purportedly) 
prevailing meaning of the term into its subsequent enactments.  But “that canon has no 
application” where, among other things, the scope of disgorgement was “far from ‘settled.’” … 
At bottom, even if Congress employed “disgorgement” as a shorthand to cross-reference 
the relief permitted by § 78u(d)(5), it did not silently rewrite the scope of what the SEC could 
recover in a way that would contravene limitations embedded in the statute.  After all, such 
“statutory reference[s]” to a remedy grounded in equity “must, absent other indication, be 
deemed to contain the limitations upon its availability that equity typically imposes.” … 
Accordingly, Congress’ own use of the term “disgorgement” in assorted statutes did not expand 
the contours of that term beyond a defendant’s net profits—a limit established by longstanding 
principles of equity. 
III 
Applying the principles discussed above to the facts of this case, petitioners briefly argue 
that their disgorgement award is unlawful because it crosses the bounds of traditional equity 
practice in three ways:  It fails to return funds to victims, it imposes joint-and-several liability, 
and it declines to deduct business expenses form the award.  Because the parties focused on the 
broad question whether any form of disgorgement may be ordered and did not fully brief these 
narrower questions, we do not decide them here.  We nevertheless discuss principles that may 
guide the lower courts’ assessment of these arguments on remand. 
A 
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Section 78u(d)(5) restricts equitable relief to that which “may be appropriate or necessary 
for the benefit of investors.”  The SEC, however, does not always return the entirety of 
disgorgement proceeds to investors, instead depositing a portion of its collections in a fund in the 
Treasury….  Congress established that fund in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act for disgorgement awards that are not deposited in “disgorgement 
fund[s]” or otherwise “distributed to victims.”…  The statute provides that these sums may be 
used to pay whistleblowers reporting securities fraud and to fund the activities of the Inspector 
General.  Here, the SEC has not returned the bulk of funds to victims, largely, it contends, 
because the Government has been unable to collect them.3 
The statute provides limited guidance as to whether the practice of depositing a 
defendant’s gains with the Treasury satisfies the statute’s command that any remedy be 
“appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors.”  The equitable nature of the profits 
remedy generally requires the SEC to return a defendant’s gains to wronged investors for their 
benefit.  After all, the Government has pointed to no analogous common-law remedy permitting 
a wrongdoer’s profits to be withheld from a victim indefinitely without being disbursed to known 
victims…. 
The Government maintains, however, that the primary function of depriving wrongdoers 
of profits is to deny them the fruits of their ill-gotten gains, not to return the funds to victims as a 
kind of restitution….  Under the Government’s theory, the very fact that it conducted an 
enforcement action satisfies the requirement that it is “appropriate or necessary for the benefit of 
investors.” 
 
3 According to the Government, petitioners “transferred the bulk of their misappropriated funds to China, defied the 
district court’s order to repatriate those funds, and fled the United States.”  Brief for Respondent 36. 
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But the SEC’s equitable, profits-based remedy must do more than simply benefit the 
public at large by virtue of depriving a wrongdoer of ill-gotten gains.  To hold otherwise would 
render meaningless the latter part of § 78u(d)(5)…. 
The Government additionally suggests that the SEC’s practice of depositing 
disgorgement funds with the Treasury may be justified where it is infeasible to distribute the 
collected funds to investors.  It is an open question whether, and to what extent, that practice 
nevertheless satisfies the SEC’s obligation to award relief “for the benefit of investors” and is 
consistent with the limitations of § 78u(d)(5).  The parties have not identified authorities 
revealing what traditional equitable principles govern when, for instance, the wrongdoer’s profits 
cannot practically be disbursed to the victims.  But we need not address the issue here.  The 
parties do not identify a specific order in this case directing any proceeds to the Treasury.  If one 
is entered on remand, the lower courts may evaluate in the first instance whether that order 
would indeed be for the benefit of investors as required by § 78u(d)(5) and consistent with 
equitable principles. 
B 
The SEC additionally has sought to impose disgorgement liability on a wrongdoer for 
benefits that accrue to his affiliates, sometimes through joint-and-several liability, in a manner 
sometimes seemingly at odds with the common-law rule requiring individual liability for 
wrongful profits.  See, e.g., SEC v. Contorinis, 743 F.3d 296, 302 (CA2 2014) (holding that a 
defendant could be forced to disgorge not only what he “personally enjoyed from his exploitation 
of insider information, but also the profits of such exploitation that he channeled to friends, 
family, or clients”); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439, 454 (CA9 1990) (“It is well settled that a tipper 
can be required to disgorge his tippee’s profits”)…. 
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That practice could transform any equitable profits-focused remedy into a penalty.  And it 
runs against the rule to not impose joint liability in favor of holding defendants “liable to account 
for such profits only as have accrued to themselves … and not for those which have accrued to 
another, and in which they have no participation.”… 
The common law did, however, permit liability for partners engaged in concerted 
wrongdoing.  The historic profits remedy thus allows some flexibility to impose collective 
liability.  Given the wide spectrum of relationships between participants and beneficiaries of 
unlawful schemes—from equally culpable codefendants to more remote, unrelated tipper-tippee 
arrangements—the Court need not wade into all the circumstances where an equitable profits 
remedy might be punitive when applied to multiple individuals. 
Here petitioners were married.  The Government introduced evidence that Liu formed 
business entities and solicited investments, which he misappropriated.  It also presented evidence 
that Wang held herself out as the president, and a member of the management team, of an entity 
to which Liu directed misappropriated funds.  Petitioners did not introduce evidence to suggest 
that one spouse was a mere passive recipient of profits.  Nor did they suggest that their finances 
were not commingled, or that one spouse did not enjoy the fruits of the scheme, or that other 
circumstances would render a joint-and-several disgorgement order unjust….  We leave it to the 
Ninth Circuit on remand to determine whether the facts are such that petitioners can, consistent 
with equitable principles, be found liable for profits as partners in wrongdoing or whether 
individual liability is required. 




Courts may not enter disgorgement awards that exceed the gains “made upon any 
business or investment, when both the receipts and payments are taken into the account.”…  
Accordingly,  courts  must  deduct  legitimate  expenses  before  ordering  disgorgement  under  
§ 78u(d)(5).  A rule to the contrary that “make[s] no allowance for the cost and expense of 
conducting [a] business” would be “inconsistent with the ordinary principles and practice of 
courts of chancery.”… 
The District Court below declined to deduct expenses on the theory that they were 
incurred for the purposes of furthering an entirely fraudulent scheme.  It is true that when the 
“entire profit of a business or undertaking” results from the wrongdoing, a defendant may be 
denied “inequitable deductions” such as for personal services.  But that exception requires 
ascertaining whether expenses are legitimate or whether they are merely wrongful gains “under 
another name.”  Doing so will ensure that any disgorgement award falls within the limits of 
equity practice while preventing defendants from profiting from their own wrong. 
Although it is not necessary to set forth more guidance addressing the various 
circumstances where a defendant’s expenses might be considered wholly fraudulent, it suffices 
to note that some expenses from petitioners’ scheme went toward lease payments and cancer-
treatment equipment.  Such items arguably have value independent of fueling a fraudulent 
scheme.  We leave it to the lower court to examine whether including those expenses in a profits-
based remedy is consistent with the equitable principles underlying § 78u(d)(5). 
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* * * 
For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment below and remand the case to the 
Ninth Circuit for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
JUSTICE THOMAS, dissenting. 
The Court correctly declines to affirm the Ninth Circuit’s decision upholding the District 
Court’s disgorgement order, but I disagree with the Court’s decision to vacate and remand for the 
lower courts to “limi[t]” the disgorgement award.  Disgorgement can never be awarded under 15 
U.S.C. § 78u(d)(5).  That statute authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to 
seek only “equitable relief that may be appropriate or necessary for the benefit of investors,” and 
disgorgement is not a traditional equitable remedy.  Thus, I would reverse the judgment of the 
Court of Appeals. 
…. 
One need look no further than the SEC’s use of disgorgement to see the pitfalls of the 
majority’s acquiescence in its continued use as a remedy.  The order in Texas Gulf Sulphur did 
not depart too far from equitable principles.  The award was limited to the defendants’ net profits 
and the funds were held in escrow and were at least partly available to compensate victims, 446 
F.2d, at 1307 [(2d Cir. 1968)].  It did not take long, however, for a district court to order a 
defendant to turn over both his profits and the investment “income earned on the proceeds.”  
Manor Nursing Centers, 458 F.2d, at 1105 [(2d Cir. 1972)].  And in the case before us today, just 
a half century later, disgorgement has expanded even further.  The award is not limited to net 
profits or even money possessed by an individual defendant when it is imposed jointly and 
severally.  And not only is it not guaranteed to be used to compensate victims, but the imposition 
Copyright © 2020 Carolina Academic Press, LLC. All rights reserved.
-91- 
 
of over $26 million in disgorgement and approximately $8 million in civil monetary penalties in 
this case seems to ensure that victims will be unable to recover anything in their own actions.  As 
long as courts continue to award “disgorgement,” both courts and the SEC will continue to have 
license to expand their own power. 
The majority’s decision to tame, rather than reject, disgorgement will also cause 
confusion in administrative practice.  As the majority explains, the SEC is expressly authorized 
to impose “‘disgorgement’” in its in -house tribunals.  It is unclear whether the majority’s new 
restrictions on disgorgement will apply to these proceedings as well.  If they do not, the result 
will be that disgorgement has one meaning when the SEC goes to district court and another when 
it proceeds in-house. 
More fundamentally, by failing to recognize that the problem is disgorgement itself, the 
majority undermines our entire system of equity.  The majority believes that insistence on the 
traditional rules of equity is unnecessarily formalistic, but the Founders accepted federal 
equitable powers only because those powers depended on traditional forms.  The Constitution 
was ratified on the understanding that equity was “a precise legal system” with “specific 
equitable remed[ies].”  The majority, while imposing some limits, ultimately permits courts to 
continue expanding equitable remedies.  I would simply hold that the phrase “equitable relief” in 
§ 78u(d)(5) does not authorize disgorgement. 
…. 
After holding that disgorgement is equitable relief, the majority remands for the lower 
courts to reconsider the disgorgement order in this case.  If the majority is going to accept 
“disgorgement” as an available remedy, it should at least limit the order to be consistent with the 
traditional rules of equity.  First, the order should be limited to each petitioner’s profits.  Second, 
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the order should not be imposed jointly and severally.  Third, the money paid by petitioners 
should be used to compensate petitioners’ victims. 
…. 
I would reverse for the straightforward reason that disgorgement is not “equitable relief” 
within the meaning of § 78u(d)(5).  Because the majority acquiesces in the continued use of 




[C] Other SEC Administrative Proceedings 
 On page 714, add: 
LUCIA v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 
United States Supreme Court 
___ U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 736, 199 L. Ed 2d 602 (2018) 
JUSTICE KAGAN delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The Appointments Clause of the Constitution lays out the permissible methods of 
appointing “Officers of the United States,” a class of government officials distinct from mere 
employees.  Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. This case requires us to decide whether administrative law judges 
(ALJs) of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) qualify as such 
“Officers.”  In keeping with Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991), we hold that they 
do. 
I 
The SEC has statutory authority to enforce the nation’s securities laws.  One way it can 
do so is by instituting an administrative proceeding against an alleged wrongdoer.  By law, the 
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Commission may itself preside over such a proceeding.  But the Commission also may, and 
typically does, delegate that task to an ALJ.  The SEC currently has five ALJs.  Other staff 
members, rather than the Commission proper, selected them all. 
An ALJ assigned to hear an SEC enforcement action has extensive powers—the 
“authority to do all things necessary and appropriate to discharge his or her duties” and ensure a 
“fair and orderly” adversarial proceeding.  Those powers “include, but are not limited to,” 
supervising discovery; issuing, revoking, or modifying subpoenas; deciding motions; ruling on 
the admissibility of evidence; administering oaths; hearing and examining witnesses; generally 
“[r]egulating the course of” the proceeding and the “conduct of the parties and their counsel”; 
and imposing sanctions for “[c]ontemptuous conduct” of violations of procedural requirements.  
As that list suggests, an SEC ALJ exercises authority “comparable to” that of a federal district 
judge conducting a bench trial. 
After a hearing ends, the ALJ issues an “initial decision.”  That decision must set out 
“findings and conclusions” about all “material issues of fact [and] law”; it also must include the 
“appropriate order, sanction, relief, or denial thereof.”  The Commission can then review the 
ALJ’s decision, either upon request or sua sponte.  But if it opts against review, the Commission 
“issue[s] an order that the [ALJ’s] decision has become final.”  At that point, the initial decision 
is “deemed the action of the Commission.” 
This case began when the SEC instituted an administrative proceeding against petitioner 
Raymond Lucia and his investment company.  Lucia marketed a retirement savings strategy 
called “Buckets of Money.”  In the SEC’s view, Lucia used misleading slideshow presentations 
to deceive prospective clients.   The SEC charged  Lucia  under  the  Investment  Advisers  Act, 
§ 80b-1 et seq., and assigned ALJ Cameron Elliot to adjudicate the case.  After nine days of 
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testimony and argument, Judge Elliot issued an initial decision concluding that Lucia had 
violated the Act and imposing sanctions, including civil penalties of $300,000 and a lifetime bar 
from the investment industry.  In his decision, Judge Elliot made factual findings about only one 
of the four ways the SEC thought Lucia’s slideshow misled investors.  The Commission thus 
remanded for factfinding on the other three claims, explaining that an ALJ’s “personal 
experience with the witnesses” places him “in the best position to make findings of fact” and 
“resolve any conflicts in the evidence.”  Judge Elliot then made additional findings of deception 
and issued a revised initial decision, with the same sanctions. 
On appeal to the SEC, Lucia argued that the administrative proceeding was invalid 
because Judge Elliot had not been constitutionally appointed.  According to Lucia, the 
Commission’s ALJs are “Officers of the United States” and thus subject to the Appointments 
Clause.  Under that Clause, Lucia noted, only the President, “Courts of Law,” or “Heads of 
Departments” can appoint “Officers.”  See Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  And none of those actors had made 
Judge Elliot an ALJ. To be sure, the Commission itself counts as a “Head[] of Department[].” . . .  
But the Commission had left the task of appointing ALJs, including Judge Elliot, to SEC staff 
members.  As a result, Lucia contended, Judge Elliot lacked constitutional authority to do his 
job. 
The Commission rejected Lucia’s argument.  It held that the SEC’s ALJs are not 
“Officers of the United States.”  Instead, they are “mere employees”—officials with lesser 
responsibilities who fall outside the Appointments Clause’s ambit.  The Commission reasoned 
that its ALJs do not “exercise significant authority independent of [its own] supervision.” 
Because that is so (said the SEC), they need no special, high-level appointment. 
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Lucia’s claim fared no better in the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit.  A panel of that 
court seconded the Commission’s view that SEC ALJs are employees rather than officers, and so 
are not subject to the Appointments Clause.  See 832 F. 3d 277, 283-289 (2016).  Lucia then 
petitioned for rehearing en banc.  The Court of Appeals granted that request and heard argument 
in the case.  But the ten members of the en banc court divided evenly, resulting in a per curiam 
order denying Lucia’s claim.  See 868 F.3d 1021 (2017).  That decision conflicted with one from 
the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.  See Bandimere v. SEC, 844 F. 3d 1168, 1179 (2016). 
Lucia asked us to resolve the split by deciding whether the Commission’s ALJs are 
“Officers of the United States within the meaning of the Appointments Clause.”  Up to that 
point, the Federal Government (as represented by the Department of Justice) had defended the 
Commission’s position that SEC ALJs are employees, not officers.  But in responding to Lucia’s 
petition, the Government switched sides.  So when we granted the petition, we also appointed an 
amicus curiae to defend the judgment below.  We now reverse. 
II 
The sole question here is whether the Commission’s ALJs are “Officers of the United 
States” or simply employees of the Federal Government.  The Appointments Clause prescribes 
the exclusive means of appointing “Officers.”  Only the President, a court of law, or a head of 
department can do so.  See Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.  And as all parties agree, none of those actors 
appointed Judge Elliot before he heard Lucia’s case; instead, SEC staff members gave him an 
ALJ slot.  So if the Commission’s ALJs are constitutional officers, Lucia raises a valid 
Appointments Clause claim.  The only way to defeat his position is to show that those ALJs are 
not officers at all, but instead non-officer employees—part of the broad swath of “lesser 
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functionaries” in the Government’s workforce.  For if that is true, the Appointments Clause cares 
not a whit about who named them. . . . 
Two decisions set out this Court’s basic framework for distinguishing between officers 
and employees.  United States v. Germaine held that “civil surgeons” (doctors hired to perform 
various physical exams) were mere employees because their duties were “occasional or 
temporary” rather than “continuing and permanent.” [99 U.S. 508 at 511-512 (1879).]  Stressing 
“ideas of tenure [and] duration,” the Court there made clear that an individual must occupy a 
“continuing” position established by law to qualify as an officer.  Buckley [v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 
(1976)] then set out another requirement, central to this case.  It determined that members of a 
federal commission were officers only after finding that they “exercise[ed] significant authority 
pursuant to the laws of the United States.”  The inquiry thus focused on the extent of power an 
individual wields in carrying out his assigned functions. 
Both the amicus and the Government urge us to elaborate on Buckley’s “significant 
authority” test, but another of our precedents makes that project unnecessary.  The standard is no 
doubt framed in general terms, tempting advocates to add whatever glosses best suit their 
arguments. . . .  And maybe one day we will see a need to refine or enhance the test Buckley set 
out so concisely.  But that day is not this one, because in Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 
(1991), we applied the unadorned “significant authority” test to adjudicative officials who are 
near-carbon copies of the Commission’s ALJs.  As we now explain, our analysis there (sans any 
more detailed legal criteria) necessarily decides this case. 
The officials at issue in Freytag were the “special trial judges” (STJs) of the United 
States Tax Court.  The authority of those judges depended on the significance of the tax dispute 
before them.  In “comparatively narrow and minor matters,” they could both hear and 
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definitively resolve a case for the Tax Court.  In more major matters, they could preside over the 
hearing, but could not issue the final decision; instead, they were to “prepare proposed findings 
and an opinion” for a regular Tax Court judge to consider.  The proceeding challenged in 
Freytag was a major one, involving $1.5 billion in alleged tax deficiencies.  After conducting a 
14-week trial, the STJ drafted a proposed decision in favor of the Government.  A regular judge 
then adopted the STJ’s work as the opinion of the Tax Court.  The losing parties argued on 
appeal that the STJ was not constitutionally appointed. 
This Court held that the Tax Court’s STJs are officers, not mere employees.  Citing 
Germaine, the Court first found that STJs hold a continuing office established by law.  They 
serve on an ongoing, rather than a “temporary [or] episodic[,] basis”; and their “duties, salary, 
and means of appointment” are all specified in the Tax Code.  The Court then considered, as 
Buckley demands, the “significance” of the “authority” STJs wield.  In addressing that issue, the 
Government had argued that STJs are employees, rather than officers, in all cases (like the one at 
issue) in which they could not “enter a final decision.”  But the Court thought the Government’s 
focus on finality “ignore[d] the significance of the duties and discretion that [STJs] possess.”  
Describing the responsibilities involved in presiding over adversarial hearings, the Court said:  
STJs “take testimony, conduct trials, rule on the admissibility of evidence, and have the power to 
enforce compliance with discovery orders.”  And the Court observed that “[i]n the course of 
carrying out these important functions, the [STJs] exercise significant discretion.”  That fact 
meant they were officers, even when their decisions were not final.  
Freytag says everything necessary to decide this case.  To begin, the Commission’s 
ALJs, like the Tax Court’s STJs, hold a continuing office established by law.  Indeed, everyone 
here—Lucia, the Government, and the amicus—agrees on that point. . . .  Far from serving 
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temporarily or episodically, SEC ALJs “receive[ ] a career appointment.”  And that appointment 
is to a position created by statute, down to its “duties, salary, and means of appointment.” 
Still more, the Commission’s ALJs exercise the same “significant discretion” when 
carrying out the same “important functions” as STJs do.  Both sets of officials have all the 
authority needed to ensure fair and orderly adversarial hearings—indeed, nearly all the tools of 
federal trial judges.  Consider in order the four specific (if overlapping) powers Freytag 
mentioned.  First, the Commission’s ALJs (like the Tax Court’s STJs) “take testimony.”  More 
precisely, they “[r]eceiv[e] evidence” and “[e]xamine witnesses” at hearings, and may also take 
pre-hearing depositions. . . .  Second, the ALJs (like STJs) “conduct trials.”  As detailed earlier, 
they administer oaths, rule on motions, and generally “regulat[e] the course of” a hearing, as well 
as the conduct of parties and counsel.  Third, the ALJs (like STJs) “rule on the admissibility of 
evidence.”  They thus critically shape the administrative record (as they also do when issuing 
document subpoenas).  And fourth, the ALJs (like STJs) “have the power to enforce compliance 
with discovery orders.”  In particular, they may punish all “[c]ontemptuous conduct,” including 
violations of those orders, by means as severe as excluding the offender from the hearing.  So 
point for point—straight from Freytag’s list—the Commission’s ALJs have equivalent duties 
and powers as STJs in conducting adversarial inquiries. 
And at the close of those proceedings, ALJs issue decisions much like that in Freytag—
except with potentially more independent effect.  As the Freytag Court recounted, STJs “prepare 
proposed findings and an opinion” adjudicating charges and assessing tax liabilities.  Similarly, 
the Commission’s ALJs issue decisions containing factual findings, legal conclusions, and 
appropriate remedies.  And what happens next reveals that the ALJ can play the more 
autonomous role.  In a major case like Freytag, a regular Tax Court judge must always review an 
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STJ’s opinion.  And that opinion counts for nothing unless the regular judge adopts it as his own.  
By contrast, the SEC can decide against reviewing an ALJ decision at all.  And when the SEC 
declines review (and issues an order saying so), the ALJ’s decision itself “becomes final” and is 
“deemed the action of the Commission.” . . .  That last-word capacity makes this an a fortiori 
case:  If the Tax Court’s STJs are officers, as Freytag held, then the Commission’s ALJs must be 
too. 
The amicus offers up two distinctions to support the opposite conclusion.  His main 
argument relates to “the power to enforce compliance with discovery orders”—the fourth of 
Freytag’s listed functions.  The Tax Court’s STJs, he states, had that power “because they had 
authority to punish contempt” (including discovery violations) through fines or imprisonment.  
. . .  By contrast, he observes, the Commission’s ALJs have less capacious power to sanction 
misconduct.  The amicus’s secondary distinction involves how the Tax Court and Commission, 
respectively, review the factfinding of STJs and ALJs.  The Tax Court’s rules state that an STJ’s 
finding of fact “shall be presumed” correct.  In comparison, the amicus notes, the SEC’s 
regulations include no such deferential standard. 
But those distinctions make no difference for officer status.  To start with the amicus’s 
primary point, Freytag referenced only the general “power to enforce compliance with discovery 
orders,” not any particular method of doing so.  True enough, the power to toss malefactors in 
jail is an especially muscular means of enforcement—the nuclear option of compliance tools.  
But just as armies can often enforce their will through conventional weapons, so too can 
administrative judges.  As noted earlier, the Commission’s ALJs can respond to discovery 
violations and other contemptuous conduct by excluding the wrongdoer (whether party or 
lawyer) from the proceedings—a powerful disincentive to resist a court order.  Similarly, if the 
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offender is an attorney, the ALJ can “[s]ummarily suspend” him from representing his client—
not something the typical lawyer wants to invite.  And finally, a judge who will, in the end, issue 
an opinion complete with factual findings, legal conclusions, and sanctions has substantial 
informal power to ensure the parties stay in line.  Contrary to the amicus’s view, all that is 
enough to satisfy Freytag’s fourth item (even supposing, which we do not decide, that each of 
those items is necessary for someone conducting adversarial hearings to count as an officer). 
And the amicus’s standard-of-review distinction fares just as badly.  The Freytag Court 
never suggested that the deference given to STJs’ factual findings mattered to its Appointments 
Clause analysis.  Indeed, the relevant part of Freytag did not so much as mention the subject 
(even though it came up at oral argument). . . .  And anyway, the Commission often accords a 
similar deference to its ALJs, even if not by regulation.  The Commission has repeatedly stated, 
as it did below, that its ALJs are in the “best position to make findings of fact” and “resolve any 
conflicts in the evidence.” . . .  And when factfinding derives from credibility judgments, as it 
frequently does, acceptance is near-automatic.  Recognizing ALJs’ “personal experience with the 
witnesses,” the Commission adopts their “credibility finding[s] absent overwhelming evidence to 
the contrary.” . . .  That practice erases the constitutional line the amicus proposes to draw. 
The only issue left is remedial.  For all the reasons we have given, and all those Freytag 
gave before, the Commission’s ALJs are “Officers of the United States,” subject to the 
Appointments Clause.  And as noted earlier, Judge Elliot heard and decided Lucia’s case without 
the kind of appointment the Clause requires.  This Court has held that “one who makes a timely 
challenge to the constitutional validity of the appointment of an officer who adjudicates his case” 
is entitled to relief.  Lucia made just such a timely challenge:  He contested the validity of Judge 
Elliot’s appointment before the Commission, and continued pressing that claim in the Court of 
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Appeals and this Court.  So what relief follows?  This Court has also held that the “appropriate” 
remedy for an adjudication tainted with an appointments violation is a new “hearing before a 
properly appointed” official.  And we add today one thing more.  That official cannot be Judge 
Elliot, even if he has by now received (or receives sometime in the future) a constitutional 
appointment.  Judge Elliot has already both heard Lucia’s case and issued an initial decision on 
the merits.  He cannot be expected to consider the matter as though he had not adjudicated it 
before.  To cure the constitutional error, another ALJ (or the Commission itself) must hold the 
new hearing to which Lucia is entitled. 
We accordingly reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
____________________ 
  




Litigation Involving Broker-Dealers and Investment Advisers 
15.01 Overview 
 [C]  Federal Regulation 
 On page 811, add: 
Adoption of Regulation Best Interest 
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 86031 (2019) 
In 2019, the SEC adopted Regulation Best Interest (BI), having a compliance date of June 
30, 2020.  The Commission rejected a fiduciary standard for broker-dealers and individuals 
associated with a broker-dealer.  In the SEC’s view, the Regulation “enhances the broker-dealer 
standard of conduct existing beyond suitability obligations, and aligns the standard of conduct 
with retail customers’ reasonable expectations ….”  Disagreeing with the Commission, several 
state attorneys general have brought suit seeking to invalidate the Regulation.  They argue that 
the Regulation neglects to harmonize norms of conduct that apply to investment advisers and 
broker-dealers and also fails to mandate that brokers serve their clients’ best interests regardless 
of the brokers’ own financial interests.  See 8 Attorneys General Sue SEC Over Regulation Best 
Interest, CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. No. 2889, at 1-3 (Sept. 19, 2019). 
In addition, the Commission adopted Form CRS (client relationship summary) requiring 
registered broker-dealers and investment advisers to provide a brief relationship summary in 
plain English to retail investors.  This relationship summary is to be provided to retail investors 
at the commencement of a client’s relationship with the firm as well as upon certain other 
material events.  This relationship summary should inform retail investors regarding the 
following:  “The types of client and customer relationships and services the firm offers; the fees, 
costs, conflicts of interest, and required standard of conduct associated with those relationships 
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and services; whether the firm and its financial professionals currently have a reportable legal or 
disciplinary history; and how to obtain additional information about the firm.”  Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 86032 (2019). 
____________________ 
 An excerpt of the SEC adopting release for Regulation Best Interest follows.   
Summary 
 The Securities and Exchange Commission (the “Commission”) is adopting a new rule 
under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), establishing a standard of conduct 
for broker-dealers and natural persons who are associated persons of a broker-dealer (unless 
otherwise indicated, together referred to as “broker-dealer”) when they make a recommendation 
to a retail customer of any securities transaction or investment strategy involving securities 
(“Regulation Best Interest”).  Regulation Best Interest enhances the broker-dealer standard of 
conduct beyond existing suitability obligations, and aligns the standard of conduct with retail 
customers’ reasonable expectations by requiring broker-dealers, among other things, to: Act in 
the best interest of the retail customer at the time the recommendation is made, without placing 
the financial or other interest of the broker-dealer ahead of the interests of the retail customer; 
and address conflicts of interest by establishing, maintaining, and enforcing policies and 
procedures reasonably designed to identify and fully and fairly disclose material facts about 
conflicts of interest, and in instances where we have determined that disclosure is insufficient to 
reasonably address the conflict, to mitigate or, in certain instances, eliminate the conflict.  The 
standard of conduct established by Regulation Best Interest cannot be satisfied through 
disclosure alone.  The standard of conduct draws from key principles underlying fiduciary 
obligations, including those that apply to investment advisers under the Investment Advisers Act 
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of 1940 (“Advisers Act”).  Importantly, regardless of whether a retail investor chooses a broker-
dealer or an investment adviser (or both), the retail investor will be entitled to a recommendation 
(from a broker-dealer) or advice (from an investment adviser) that is in the best interest of the 
retail investor and that does not place the interests of the firm or the financial professional ahead 
of the interests of the retail investor. 
 . . . . 
I. Introduction  
 We are adopting a new rule under the Exchange Act (“Regulation Best Interest”) that will 
improve investor protection by: (1) Enhancing the obligations that apply when a broker-dealer 
makes a recommendation to a retail customer and natural persons who are associated persons of 
a broker-dealer (“associated persons”) (unless otherwise indicated, together referred to as  
“broker-dealer”) and (2) reducing the potential harm to retail customers from conflicts of interest 
that may affect the recommendation.  Regulation Best Interest enhances the broker-dealer 
standard of conduct beyond existing suitability obligations, and aligns the standard of conduct 
with retail customers’ reasonable expectations by requiring broker-dealers, among other things, 
to: (1) Act in the best interest of the retail customer at the time the recommendation is made, 
without placing the financial or other interest of the broker-dealer ahead of the interests of the 
retail customer; and (2) address conflicts of interest by establishing, maintaining, and enforcing 
policies and procedures reasonably designed to identify and fully and fairly disclose material 
facts about conflicts of interest, and in instances where we have determined that disclosure is 
insufficient to reasonably address the conflict, to mitigate or, in certain instances, eliminate the 
conflict.  Regulation Best Interest establishes a standard of conduct under the Exchange Act that 
cannot be satisfied through disclosure alone. 




 Broker-dealers play an important role in helping Americans organize their finances, 
accumulate and manage retirement savings, and invest toward other important long-term goals, 
such as buying a house or funding a child’s college education.  Broker-dealers offer a wide 
variety of brokerage (i.e., agency) services and dealer (i.e., principal) services and products to 
both retail and institutional customers.  Specifically, the brokerage services provided to retail 
customers range from execution-only services to providing personalized investment advice in the 
form of recommendations of securities transactions or investment strategies involving securities 
to customers. 
 Investment advisers play a similarly important, though distinct, role.  As described in the 
Fiduciary Interpretation, investment advisers provide a wide range of services to a large variety 
of clients, from retail clients with limited assets and investment knowledge and experience to 
institutional clients with very large portfolios and substantial knowledge, experience, and 
analytical resources. 
 As a general matter, broker-dealers and investment advisers have different types of 
relationships with investors, offer different services, and have different compensation models 
when providing investment recommendations or investment advisory services to customers.  
Broker-dealers typically provide transaction-specific recommendations and receive 
compensation on a transaction-by-transaction basis (such as commissions) (“transaction-based” 
compensation or model).  A broker-dealer’s recommendations may include recommending 
transactions where the broker-dealer is buying securities from or selling securities to retail 
customers on a principal basis or recommending proprietary products.  Investment advisers, on 
the other hand, typically provide ongoing regular advice and services in the context of broad 
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investment portfolio management, and are compensated based on the value of assets under 
management (“AUM”), a fixed fee or other arrangement (“fee-based” compensation or model).  
This variety is important because it presents investors with choices regarding the types of 
relationships they can have, the services they can receive, and how they can pay for those 
services.  It is also common for a firm to provide both broker-dealer and investment adviser 
services. 
 Like many principal-agent relationships—including the investment adviser-client 
relationship—the relationship between a broker-dealer and a customer has inherent conflicts of 
interest, including those resulting from a transaction-based (e.g., commission) compensation 
structure and other broker-dealer compensation.  These and other conflicts of interest may 
provide an incentive to a broker-dealer to seek to increase its own compensation or other 
financial interests at the expense of the customer to whom it is making investment 
recommendations. 
 Notwithstanding these inherent conflicts of interest in the broker-dealer-customer 
relationship, there is broad acknowledgment of the benefits of, and support for, the continuing 
existence of the broker-dealer business model, including a commission or other transaction-based 
compensation structure, as an option for retail customers seeking investment recommendations.  
For example, retail customers that intend to buy and hold a long-term investment may find that 
paying a one-time commission to a broker-dealer recommending such an investment is more cost 
effective than paying an ongoing advisory fee to an investment adviser merely to hold the same 
investment.  Retail customers with limited investment assets may benefit from broker-dealer 
recommendations when they do not qualify for advisory accounts because they do not meet the 
account minimums often imposed by investment advisers.  Other retail customers who hold a 
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variety of investments, or prefer differing levels of services (e.g., both episodic recommendations 
from a broker-dealer and continuous advisory services including discretionary asset management 
from an investment adviser), may benefit from having access to both brokerage and advisory 
accounts.  Nevertheless, concerns exist regarding (1) the potential harm to retail customers 
resulting from broker-dealer recommendations provided where conflicts of interest exist and (2) 
the insufficiency of existing broker-dealer regulatory requirements to address these conflicts 
when broker-dealers make recommendations to retail customers.  More specifically, there are 
concerns that existing requirements do not require a broker-dealer’s recommendations to be in 
the retail customer’s best interest. 
B.  Overview of Regulation Best Interest 
 On April 18, 2018, we proposed enhancements to the standard of conduct that applies 
when broker-dealers make recommendations to retail customers. . . .  
  The Commission has crafted Regulation Best Interest to draw on key principles 
underlying fiduciary obligations, including those that apply to investment advisers under the 
Advisers Act, while providing specific requirements to address certain aspects of the 
relationships between broker-dealers and their retail customers.  Regulation Best Interest 
enhances the existing standard of conduct applicable to broker-dealers and their associated 
persons at the time they recommend to a retail customer a securities transaction or investment 
strategy involving securities.  This includes recommendations of account types and rollovers or 
transfers of assets and also covers implicit hold recommendations resulting from agreed-upon 
account monitoring.  When making a recommendation, a broker-dealer must act in the retail 
customer’s best interest and cannot place its own interests ahead of the customer’s interests 
(hereinafter, “General Obligation”).  The General Obligation is satisfied only if the broker-dealer 
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complies with four specified component obligations.  The obligations are: (1) Providing certain 
prescribed disclosure before or at the time of the recommendation, about the recommendation 
and the relationship between the retail customer and the broker-dealer (“Disclosure Obligation”); 
(2) exercising reasonable diligence, care, and skill in making the recommendation (“Care 
Obligation”); (3) establishing, maintaining, and enforcing policies and procedures reasonably 
designed to address conflicts of interest (“Conflict of Interest Obligation”), and (4) establishing, 
maintaining, and enforcing policies and procedures reasonably designed to achieve compliance 
with Regulation Best Interest (“Compliance Obligation”). 
 First, under the Disclosure Obligation, before or at the time of the recommendation, a 
broker-dealer must disclose in writing, all material facts about the scope and terms of its 
relationship with the customer.  This includes a disclosure that the firm or representative is acting 
in a broker-dealer capacity; the material fees and costs the customer will incur; and the type and 
scope of the services to be provided, including any material limitations on the recommendations 
that could be made to the retail customer.  Moreover, the broker-dealer must disclose all material 
facts relating to conflicts of interest associated with the recommendation that might incline a 
broker-dealer to make a recommendation that is not disinterested, including, for example, 
conflicts associated with proprietary products, payments from third parties, and compensation 
arrangements. 
 Second, under the Care Obligation, a broker-dealer must exercise reasonable diligence, 
care, and skill when making a recommendation to a retail customer.  The broker-dealer must 
understand potential risks, rewards, and costs associated with the recommendation.  The broker-
dealer must then consider those risks, rewards, and costs in light of the customer’s investment 
profile and have a reasonable basis to believe that the recommendation is in the customer’s best 
Copyright © 2020 Carolina Academic Press, LLC. All rights reserved.
-109- 
 
interest and does not place the broker-dealer’s interest ahead of the retail customer’s interest.  A 
broker-dealer should consider reasonable alternatives, if any, offered by the broker-dealer in 
determining whether it has a reasonable basis for making the recommendation.  Whether a 
broker-dealer has complied with the Care Obligation will be evaluated as of the time of the 
recommendation (and not in hindsight).  When recommending a series of transactions, the 
broker-dealer must have a reasonable basis to believe that the transactions taken together are not 
excessive, even if each is in the customer’s best interest when viewed in isolation. 
 Third, under the Conflict of Interest Obligation, a broker-dealer must establish, maintain, 
and enforce reasonably designed written policies and procedures  addressing conflicts of interest 
associated with its recommendations to retail customers.  These policies and procedures must be 
reasonably designed to identify all such conflicts and at a minimum disclose or eliminate them.  
Importantly, the policies and procedures must be reasonably designed to mitigate conflicts of 
interest that create an incentive for an associated person of the broker-dealer to place its interests 
or the interest of the firm ahead of the retail customer’s interest.  Moreover, when a broker-dealer 
places material limitations on recommendations that may be made to a retail customer (e.g., 
offering only proprietary or other limited range of products), the policies and procedures must be 
reasonably designed to disclose the limitations and associated conflicts and to prevent the 
limitations from causing the associated person or broker-dealer from placing the associated 
person’s or broker-dealer’s interests ahead of the customer’s interest.  Finally, the policies and 
procedures must be reasonably designed to identify and eliminate sales contests, sales quotas, 
bonuses, and non-cash compensation that are based on the sale of specific types of securities 
within a limited period of time. 
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 Fourth, under the Compliance Obligation, a broker-dealer must also establish, maintain, 
and enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to achieve compliance with 
Regulation Best Interest as a whole.  Thus, a broker-dealer’s policies and procedures must 
address not only conflicts of interest but also compliance with its Disclosure and Care 
Obligations under Regulation Best Interest. 
 The enhancements contained in Regulation Best Interest are designed to improve investor 
protection by enhancing the quality of broker-dealer recommendations to retail customers and 
reducing the potential harm to retail customers that may be caused by conflicts of interest.  
Regulation Best Interest will complement the related rules, interpretations, and guidance that the 
Commission is concurrently issuing. Individually and collectively, these actions are designed to 
help retail customers better understand and compare the services offered by broker-dealers and 
investment advisers and make an informed choice of the relationship best suited to their needs 
and circumstances, provide clarity with respect to the standards of conduct applicable to 
investment advisers and broker-dealers, and foster greater consistency in the level of protections 
provided by each regime, particularly at the point in time that a recommendation is made. 
 At the time a recommendation is made, key elements of the Regulation Best Interest 
standard of conduct that applies to broker-dealers will be similar to key elements of the fiduciary 
standard for investment advisers.  Importantly, regardless of whether a retail investor chooses a 
broker-dealer or an investment adviser (or both), the retail investor will be entitled to a 
recommendation (from a broker-dealer) or advice (from an investment adviser) that is in the best 
interest of the retail investor and that does not place the interests of the firm or the financial 
professional ahead of the interest of the retail investor. 
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 There are also key differences between Regulation Best Interest and the Advisers Act 
fiduciary standard that reflect the distinction between the services and relationships typically 
offered under the two business models.  For example, an investment adviser’s fiduciary duty 
generally includes a duty to provide ongoing advice and monitoring, while Regulation Best 
Interest imposes no such duty and instead requires that a broker-dealer act in the retail 
customer’s best interest at the time a recommendation is made.   [Note, however, if the broker-
dealer agrees to monitor the client’s account, Regulation BI applies to any  recommendations 
that ensue from the account monitoring services.  By engaging in these account monitoring 
services, the broker-dealer incurs the obligation to periodically review the client’s account and 
make recommendations thereto.  In situations where a broker-dealer declines to make a 
recommendation during such a periodic review, an implicit “hold” recommendation is deemed 
under Regulation BI to have been provided to the client.  See Bradley Berman, et. al, Regulation 
Best Interest, Harv. Law School Forum on Corporate Governance (June 19, 2018)].  In addition, 
the new obligations applicable to broker-dealers under Regulation Best Interest are more 
prescriptive than the obligations applicable to investment advisers under the Advisers Act 
fiduciary duty and reflect the characteristics of the generally applicable broker-dealer business 
model. 
 . . . . 
 We have declined to subject broker-dealers to a wholesale and complete application of 
the existing fiduciary standard under the Advisers Act because it is not appropriately tailored to 
the structure and characteristics of the broker-dealer business model (i.e., transaction-specific 
recommendations and compensation), and would not properly take into account, and build upon, 
existing obligations that apply to broker-dealers, including under FINRA rules.  Moreover, we 
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believe (and our experience indicates), that this approach would significantly reduce retail 
investor access to differing types of investment services and products, reduce retail investor 
choice in how to pay for those products and services, and increase costs for retail investors of 
obtaining investment recommendations. 
 We have also declined to craft a new uniform standard that would apply equally and 
without differentiation to both broker-dealers and investment advisers.  Adopting a “one size fits 
all” approach would risk reducing investor choice and access to existing products, services, 
service providers, and payment options, and would increase costs for firms and for retail 
investors in both broker-dealer and investment adviser relationships.  Moreover, applying a new 
uniform standard to advisers would mean jettisoning to some extent the fiduciary standard under 
the Advisers Act that has worked well for retail clients and our markets and is backed by decades 
of regulatory and judicial precedent. 
. . . . 
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